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ABSTRACT

The Peninsula Campaign of George McClellan has long
been a subject of controversy, but most of the discussion
has centered around the discrepancy between the General's
grandiose plans for ending the war in one fell swoop and the
actuality of his excruciatingly slow movement, his
reluctance to attack, and his perennial and petulant demands
for reinforcements so as to carry out his plans.. In
particular, he was outraged that, at the outset of his
campaign, an entire corps--the one intended to perform a
flanking maneuver necessary for a rapid advance— was
withheld from his operating army and retained for the
defense of Washington.
McClellan insisted that he had made adequate provisions
and left sufficient troops for the security of the capital;
therefore, this decision could not have been made for
military reasons and must have been prompted by a
politically-motivated conspiracy to deny him and his Army
the triumph of ending the war. His civilian superiors
countered that he had engaged in creative bookkeeping when
he outlined the forces left in Northern Virginia, and they
were entirely justified in retaining I Corps.
This issue turns on the question of the two accountings
of troops in and around Washington.
But. it also requires
inquiry into the peculiar nature of the politico-military
structure of the Federal government at the beginning of the
Civil War. This thesis examines these conditions in an
attempt to determine whether or not the decision to withhold
I Corps was based in military necessity.

vi

THE UNKINDEST COT:
THE DECISION TO WITHHOLD I CORPS
FROM THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 1862

INTRODUCTION

There is no stir or walking in the streets,
And the complexion of the element
In favour's like the work we have in hand,
Most bloody, fiery, and most terrible.
Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene iii

If the story of George B. McClellan and his plans for a
brilliant campaign on the Virginia peninsula in 1862 were to
be staged, Shakespeare's Julius Caesar would be a likely
vehicle.

The setting and cast of characters for the two

dramas are remarkably similar; and many of the same emotions
are roiling about both stages (Roman/Elizabethan and
Industrial Age American).

The end of republican Rome and

beginning of Republican America were eras of high passions,
when politicians and generals strove to vanquish one another
and shape the world to their ends.
McClellan himself, beginning with his accession to the
command of the Division of the Potomac, and continuing to
this day, has been accused of bestriding the narrow world
like a Colossus.
basis in fact:
overweening.
created.

Those charges are certainly not without
the Young Napoleon was arrogant and

He was adored— even venerated— by the Army he

The Potomac could easily have become his Rubicon.
2

Like Caesar, at times he held himself above the civilians
who crippled his plans and fettered his ambitions.
And there was no lack of petty men who scorned to peep
about to find themselves dishonorable graves:

other

ambitious generals, and, of course, Radical Republicans, who
did not deem themselves underlings to such as McClellan.

In

Edwin M. Stanton one recognizes yon metaphorically lean and
hungry Cassius (whom even the self-besotted Caesar knew
should be watched).

Benjamin F. Wade emulated envious

Casca, and Irvin McDowell would make a serviceable Brutus.
There is no Antony, but with Abraham Lincoln waiting in the
wings as Octavian, the drama of the Peninsula Campaign yet
reads much like the first three acts of the Bard's tragedy.
McClellan himself no doubt would have preferred to be
cast as the warrior-king of Henry V , Prince Hal grown up
into his heroic destiny.

But that would have been before

the Spring of 18 62, when he found his command undermined.
Then he would have recognized the parallels between his role
and that of Julius.

The finale of the nineteenth century

drama would differ from the Bard's:

in the end, the latter-

day Republican ideologues triumphed, not only over their
feared Caesar but over the incipient Augustus as well.
the General was nonetheless undone:

But

as he took to the field

to crush the Confederate Army in Virginia and win the
accolades of the nation, an entire corps on which he had
counted was detached from his operating force on the grounds
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that the city of Washington must before all else be
unassailable.

McClellan felt that, like Caesar, he had been

cut down brutally just when he was reaching for his greatest
(and best-deserved)

triumph.

There were other blows--at the same time McClellan was
stripped of overall command and even lost control over his
theatre of operations; recruiting was halted just as he took
to the field; naval support on which he had counted was not
forthcoming.

But indubitably the unkindest cut of all to

his mind was the withholding of I Corps, basely and
treacherously removed by an erstwhile friend and supporter
for purely political reasons.

Stanton claimed that the

troops were necessary for the security of Washington, which
had been left defenseless by McClellan, a charge that
outraged the General.

He had assuredly made adequate

provisions for the safety of the capital.

Therefore the

sabotaging of his plans for the campaign that would end the
war had to be a foul conspiracy to destroy him for purely
political reasons.

The issue turns on whether the General

in fact left Washington "entirely secure" before leaving for
the Peninsula.

CHAPTER ONE
DOGS OF WAR

Fierce fiery warriors fight upon the clouds
In ranks and squadrons and right form of war
Which drizzled blood upon the Capitol.
II,i
In many ways, the advent of the first Republican
Administration was as tumultuous as the final days of
Republican Rome.

In less than a decade, the new political

party had coalesced and wrested control of the national
government from the previously dominant Democrats.

In the

election of 1860 it was abetted in this by the Democrats,
who split their vote among three candidates representing
southern, northern and union interests.

That fall Abraham

Lincoln was elected President on a platform that included
opposition to the extension of slavery and protective
tariffs for northern industry.

Almost immediately, southern

states began seceding from the Union.
Republicans were more or less opposed to slavery (on a
variety of moral and economic grounds) and felt it necessary
to root out the entrenched power of the slaveocracy in order

5
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to establish complete political control over the growing
nation.^
Members of the Radical wing were combative, righteous
and vindictive men with a passionate hatred for slavery and
its political representatives.

Even more revolutionary were

the abolitionists, who often pushed the Radicals further
than they might otherwise go.

Radical leaders elected to

the Senate were Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, Zachariah Chandler
of Michigan and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts; Thaddeus
Stevens of Pennsylvania led their forces in the House.2
The Radical agenda called for Slave Power to be
obliterated, so these men were convinced that a short war to
restore the union might end too quickly to destroy slavery
and its attendant political power, impeding economic change.
For this reason, they were suspicious of all Democrats and
even non-Radical Republicans, who did not share their
fervor.

As the nation mobilized and controversy grew around

war aims, Radicals also had visions of a Democratic
politico-military conspiracy to prevent the complete
subjugation of the South.

Their worst nightmare was that a

military dictatorship would grow in an Army commanded by
West Point-trained Democratic-inclined generals.

Therefore,

4 . Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison,
Wis.:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 4-5, 7.
2Ibid., 5-8.
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control of military patronage would become a crucial element
in the Radical scheme.3
Moderates hoped for a gradual end to slavery and
favored a compensated emancipation and the colonization for
the freed blacks.

They distrusted the fanaticism of their

Radical counterparts, who were characterized by Lincoln's
secretary John Hay as "Jacobins."

As a Moderate, Lincoln

held the restoration of the Union to be paramount— above
party considerations and certainly above emancipation of the
slaves, which he believed (at least initially) was
incidental to war aims.^

But he was the head of a rather

precarious coalition government composed of war Democrats,
old Whigs, miscellaneous southern Unionists and various
wings of his own party; he had a job of work to keep them
all functioning together.

This diversity was reflected in

his own cabinet, whose dominant members were Secretary of
State William H. Seward, Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase.^

To a lesser

extent, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Attorney

3Ibid., 10-26, passim.
4Ibid., 5, 10.
^Cameron resigned to become Ambassador to Russia in
January, 1862, and was replaced by Edwin M. Stanton, who is
discussed later.
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General Edward Bates, and Postmaster General Montgomery
Blair also shaped p o l i c y . ^
Seward, former Governor of and Senator from New York,
had been Lincoln's chief competition at the Chicago
convention in the summer of

1 8 6 0 .^

He was not a Radical,

but Chase, his rival, was.

The two men actively disliked

one another, and it was a very delicate and diplomatic dance
indeed that Lincoln performed to bring them both into his
cabinet.

Noted Welles of the function of the two rivals in

the cabinet, "Seward comforts him [Lincoln]— Chase he deems
a necessity."8

Chase's overriding motivation was

"unappeasable ambition for official power and distinction,"
Welles wrote; his sole aim throughout his term in the
cabinet was to build a power base of support for another bid
for the presidency in 1864. ^

A Radical mole in the cabinet,

he was influential in the appointment of many high-ranking

^Hannibal Hamlin as Vice-President and Caleb B. Smith
as Secretary of the Interior are of little interest to this
story except to note that they were chosen largely as
concessions to the Republican interests in their respective
states, Maine and Indiana.
^Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol 2, The War Years
(New York:
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1963),
42.
^Thomas G. and Marva R. Belden, So Fell the Angels
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956), 73.
^Gideon Welles, Selected Essays by Gideon Welles, vol
2, Lincoln's Administration, ed. Albert Mordell (New York:
Twayne Publishers, 19 60), 36; Alexander McClure, Lincoln and
Men of War-Times, ed. J. Stuart Torrey (Philadelphia:
Rolley and Reynolds, Inc., 1962), 129-30.
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officers, including Irvin McDowell as commander of the
Division of the Potomac.^

Cameron, a Republican leader

from Pennsylvania and part of the Radical clique, was in the
cabinet as the result of a political deal, pure and simple:
it had been the release of his delegates at the 1860
convention that had begun the stampede for Lincoln.^
Cameron's ineptitude eventually forced Lincoln to replace
him with Edwin M. Stanton.
Bates, former Attorney General of Missouri, had also
been a state senator and U.S. Congressman.

Welles, a Jack

sonian Democrat from Connecticut, had studied law, but had
achieved his influence as a newspaper editor.
only West Point graduate in the cabinet.

Blair was the

He had served as

counsel for Dred Scott before the Supreme Court and helped
find a lawyer to defend John Brown. 1 ?
All these were men of strong opinions and ambitions; it
was frequently a fractious group, and Lincoln was often hard
put to balance their diverging interests.

Further, neither

the President nor his cabinet had any experience with the
administering of a national government.

And, in the midst

^Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase:
A Life in
Politics (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State Press, 1987), 173-74.
After the advent of Stanton to the War Department, Chase was
excluded from military decisions, which were thereupon made
solely by Lincoln and Stanton.
Ibid., 175.
■^Sandburg, War Years, 2:44-45.
^Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1946), 296.
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of a war crisis, they were "innocent of military abilities,"
in the words of the Navy Secretary.^
If the Lincoln Administration was unsettled, the
condition of the army was hardly any better at the outset of
the war.

The American tradition opposing a military

establishment had limited the regular army in 1860 to about
16,000 professional soldiers stationed largely in the West.
It was further weakened by the resignation of many gifted
leaders, who "went South" as their native states seceded,
leaving about 13,000 troops.

Many military commanders

lacked practical knowledge of warfare, and "military
differences and army jealousies existed from the beginning,
which were aggravated and stimulated by partisan friends and
opponents of rival officers, and by dissent from the policy
pursued in the conduct of military affairs to which many
took exception ."^
At the beginning, command structure was nebulous.

The

President was, of course, the Commander-in-Chief, but he
traditionally did not make military decisions.

He was to

set policy and advise on the execution of policy.

The War

Secretary's role was amorphous, tending to grow or shrink in
power depending on the individual holding it.

Cameron

hardly affected army commanders; Stanton would be a force to

^-^Welles, Lincoln's Administration, 69-70.
14Ibid. , 57.
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be reckoned with.

The General-in-Chief formulated plans for

the army; the President and cabinet approved them.

The Navy

Secretary (or Assistant Secretary) made naval plans.

There

was no requirement for cabinet officers to coordinate
operations with each other or with the Commanding General.
Beyond these, there were special appointed boards and
committees to deal with military objectives.

In effect,

"Washington swarmed with amateur Napoleons."^
Morever, there was no central control within the army
itself.

There were seven bureau chiefs, who were not

responsible to the General-in-Chief, but reported directly
to the Secretary of War.

Under Cameron, they operated more

like satraps than as integrated elements in a military
command.

Later, under Stanton, they were to become more

coordinated, but they never achieved real efficiency .^
By June of 1861,
would expand further

field armies had grown

(and

as the war went on); no one in the

military had had anyexperience with
There was no general

to 30,000

forces that

large.

staff, no staff schools and

little

^Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), xiii-xiv.
17Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the
Union Army: A Biography of M.C. Meigs (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1959), 217. The chiefs were Adjutant
General, Commissary General, Surgeon General, Paymaster
General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and
Quartermaster General.
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military literature to help bridge the knowledge gap.1^
Officers who had served in the Mexican War twenty years
earlier had been subalterns then.

Only such relics as

General-in-Chief Winfield Scott or Ethan Allen Hitchcock had
held command roles in 1846; and now they were too old to
take the field.

British war correspondent William Howard

Russell summarized, "It is a commentary full of instruction
on the military system of the Americans that they have not a
soldier who has ever handled a brigade in the field fit for
service in the North."19
Politics was deeply embedded in the structure of the
Union forces.

The vast bulk of the massive armies that were

to be raised were organized in units of volunteers.
men elected their officers;

These

"charlatans, incompetents and

demagogues were put into the most responsible places . . .
untold harm was done both to the morals and efficiency of
the army."

Further up the chain of command there was no

hierarchy of rank and authority.

A major general could

command anything from a division to an army; this situation

18Ibid., 165.
1923 July 1861, William Howard Russell, My Diary North
and South, ed. Eugene H. Berwanger (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1988), 218.
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led to jealousy and insistence on seniority of appointment,
which further disrupted the prosecution of the w a r . ^
The Commander-in-Chief himself had no military
expertise.

In 1832, he had volunteered in the campaign

against Black Hawk, serving a total of eighty days in the
militia.21

This experience may have predisposed him toward

the idea of the citizen-soldier and the volunteer army.

He

also saw no difficulty in making command appointments for
political reasons.

It was a way to unite diverse groups in

the war effort and minimize

d i s s i d e n c e .

22

-gut some of these

commissions cost him--and the country— dearly.

Early on he

appointed to major generalcies Nathaniel P. Banks
(Republican) and Benjamin F. Butler (Democrat) of
Massachusetts, and John C. Fremont, the 1856 Republican
presidential candidate.

Brigadier Generals David Hunter,

Edwin V. Sumner and John Pope were also "entitled" to
commands by virtue of their political clout.

These

appointments were dreadful mistakes, which early in his
administration may be attributed to Lincoln's fumbling to
take control of all elements of government-including

20William S. Myers, A Study in Personality:
General
George Brinton McClellan (New York: D. Appleton-Century
C o . , 1934), 168-6$.
21Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol. 1, The Prairie
Years (New York:
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1960), 61.
22t . Harry Williams, Lincoln and his Generals
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 10.

(New
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patronage.
As for overall war aims and grand strategy, these were
elements that never came together, at least for the first
two years of the war.

Commanding General Winfield Scott's

Anaconda Plan called for securing the Mississippi River,
isolating the Confederacy from outside commerce or
assistance, then waiting for Unionists to come to power in
the South.

He saw no reason to invade.

In fact, he

imagined that such an action would alienate the southern
Unionists of whom he expected so much, and he believed the
North could win the war without an invasion.2^
Lincoln's original strategy differed only on one or two
points:

he intended to hold Fortress Monroe, blockade

Confederate ports, attack Charleston, and secure Washington,
D.C.24

These last two aims are interesting inasmuch as the

former was motivated more by retribution against the city
that supposedly began the war than by military necessity,
and the latter was the barb that snagged McClellan's
Peninsula plans.

Capturing Charleston had marginal military

value,.but it would be a coup for northern morale.

That

Lincoln would consider this a basic requirement of Union

2^Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861, U.S. War Department,
The War of the Rebellion:
A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-19 01), Series 1, vol
51, pt. 1:369-70. Hereinafter referred to as OR. Unless
otherwise noted, all references are to Series 1.
24Wil liams, Lincoln and his Generals, 16.
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strategy indicates he was aware of the psychological aspect
of fighting a war and gave it high priority.

That he also

made Washington's security a strategic necessity shows that
he was unsure of its safety to begin with and deemed its
protection to be doubly important.

Its loss, even the

threat of its loss would be a humiliation for the new
government and could lead to the recognition and support of
the Confederacy by European powers.

Not only must

Washington be safe, it must be seen to be safe.
And, in the early days after Fort Sumter, the city's
security was indeed doubtful.

Maryland was a slave state

and might well have seceded with Virginia, cutting off
communications and surrounding Washington with enemy
territory.

Troops marching through Baltimore on their way

to the capital were fired upon, and order was only restored
through martial law.

Rebels occupied the high ground across

the Potomac River at Arlington Heights.

Artillery

technology had given them a range of three to four miles,
and they were only two miles from Federal executive offices
and government b u i l d i n g s . T h e r e were rumors of a planned
attack on the city.^6

^Margaret Leech, Reveille in Washington (New York &
London:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1941), 99.
2^20 April 1861, John Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War in
the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, ed. Tyler Dennett (New
York: Dodd, Mead & C o ., 1939), 5.~~
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Regular forces in the District were nominal— "little
more than the usual number of dottery old bureau chiefs, and
a sprinkling of gold-laced officers from the Navy Y a r d . "27
Although Scott insisted he was not worried about the safety
of the city, Times correspondent Russell noted that there
were only seven or eight hundred regulars and two field
batteries commanded by officers of dubious loyalty to
protect it and the Navy Yard.

The Yard's commander himself

was "openly accused of treasonable sympathies."28

Russell

toured Fort Washington on the Potomac, finding it neglected.
Twenty determined men, armed with revolvers, could
have taken the whole work. Afterwards, when I
ventured to make a remark to General Scott as to
the carelessness of the garrison, he said, "A few
weeks ago it might have been taken by a bottle of
whiskey.
The whole garrison consisted of an old
Irish pensioner."2^
But forces gathered and by late June, public pressure
was mounting for some sort of advance against the Rebels.
On the 25th, Lincoln met with his cabinet and high-ranking
military men, who advised against precipitous action.

But

Lincoln and his cabinet, as "political experts" overruled
the generals:

"public sentiment would not admit of such a

27B . Franklin Cooling, III, "Civil War Deterrent:
Defenses of Washington," in Editors of Military Affairs,
Military Analysis of the Civil War (Millwood, N.Y.:
KTO
Press, 1977) , 43.
2^6 April 1861, Russell, Diary, 63.
292 April 1861, Ibid., 57-58.
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delay. 30

with newspapers running banner headlines urging

"Onward to Richmond!" the army must move.
In July, it finally did.

But it was stopped by Beau

regard's forces at a small creek near Manassas Junction.

In

a bizarre encounter observed by picnicking Washingtonians,
McDowell's green troops broke and ran.

The routed Division

of the Potomac scrambled frantically back to Washington
(some soldiers hardly pausing there on their way home);
McDowell was in disgrace.

Radical Congressmen who had

watched the battle returned to the capital convinced that
the loss had been the result of military incompetence, and
that they knew more than professional officers about
successful campaigning.31

From this moment on, they

intended to supervise the military as well as ideological
management of the war.
Lincoln's anxiety to fight had not been entirely a
consequence of public pressure.

He feared that a long war

would reshape the Union and believed that a quick end would
preserve the status quo ante bellum. ^

Now he had a

^^Weigley, 169-70; Eugene C. Drozdowski, "Edwin M.
Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War;
Toward Victory" (Ph.D.
diss., Duke University, 1964), 406.
^Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans, Lincoln's
Vanguard for Racial Justice (New York; Alfred A. Knopf,
1969), 173-74.
■^Joseph L. Harsh, ""George Brinton McClellan and the
Forgotten Alternative:
An Introduction to the Conservative
Strategy in the Civil War: April-August, 1861" (Ph.D.
diss., Rice University, 1970), 95-98. Harsh concludes that
it was Lincoln's eagerness to fight that resulted in Bull
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disorganized rabble for the defense of the capital.

He

needed someone who could bring order to the Potomac and hope
to the North.

He called on George B. McClellan, whose

victory in a minor skirmish in Western Virginia had been the
only bright spot in a dark spring and summer.

Run, not the Radicals' pressure.

Ibid., 103.

CHAPTER TWO
BESTRIDING THE WORLD
But I am constant as the northern star.
Of whose true-fix'd and resting quality
There is no fellow in the firmament.
Ill, i
When the war broke out, McClellan had left his
comfortable position as superintendent of the Ohio and
Mississippi Railroad to volunteer his services for his
native state of Pennsylvania.

As a matter of fact, the

governors of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York all wanted to
commission the 34-year-old who had had a spotless army
career after graduating first in his class at West Point.1
But William,Dennison of Ohio was first on the scene, and
McClellan accepted a major generalcy of three-month
volunteers.^

within a month, he was a Major General in the

Regular Army, commanding the Department of the Ohio; only
Winfield Scott was his superior.
His success in minor actions made him seem the logical
choice to command what was left of the Division of the

^Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan, The Young
Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 68-69.
2Clarence E. MacCartney, Lincoln and his Generals
(Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 69-70.
19
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Potomac, but there were also political reasons for this
military decision:

needing a broad base of support, Lincoln

tried to appoint notable Democrats to visible positions, and
McClellan was an important Democrat of state's rights
beliefs.^

without consulting Scott, on 22 July, the day

after the Union rout at Manassas, the President ordered
McClellan to report to Washington and take command of the
army there.4

It was a prestigious post, especially for one

so young, and he set out to replicate his organizational and
campaign success of the West.
The General had a plan.

On 2 August he sent the

President a memorandum outlining his strategy for defeating
the South and restoring the Union.

Beginning grandly, he

informed the Commander-in-Chief that in order to "crush a
population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to
constitute a nation," the Federals would have to display an
overwhelming strength.

He therefore called for an operating

army of 273,000 men, with a defense force for the capital of
less than 40,000 men (10,000 to protect the B & O Railroad
and Potomac River, 5,000 to garrison Baltimore, 3,000 at
Fort Monroe, and 20,000 "at the utmost" for Washington).5
^Lewis B. Mayhew, "George B. McClellan Reevaluated"
(Ph.D. diss., Michigan State College, 1952), 77.
4Ibid., 183.
^McClellan to Lincoln, 2 August 1861, Papers of George
B. McClellan, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
This memo is listed in his Report as 4 August; but in
McClellan's Own Story he corrects the date. George B.
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McClellan’s strategy was based on several interlocking
assumptions:

the South would make every effort to remain

independent, and its military capacity was to be respected;
hard fighting would be necessary.

Therefore, there must be

full-scale offensive operations and larger numbers both
tactically and strategically than the Confederates'; thus
the North must put a total effort into fielding large, wellequipped, trained armies.

More than victories would be

necessary--the South's entire military establishment must be
crushed.

Therefore, the ultimate victory was more important

than the immediate one.

And, finally, since the main

guideline for northern operations was reasonable certitude
of success, no hammer-and-anvil operations or premature
advances would be contemplated.^
McClellan wanted the nation's military resources
concentrated under his command in the Virginia theatre.
Toward that end, on 2 0 August, the Army of the Potomac was
created by his general order, over Scott's objections.

It

included the two departments originally part of his command
(Northeastern Virginia, and Washington and its vicinity on

McClellan, Report on the Organization of the Army of the
Potomac, to which Is Added an Account of the Campaign in
Western Virginia (New York: Sheldon, 1864), 4 0-41; Idem,
McClellan's Own Story: The War for the Union, The Soldiers
who Fought It, The Civilians who Directed it, and his
Relations to it and to them (New York: Charles L. Webster &
C o . , 1887), 101-105.
%arsh,

"Forgotten Alternative," 195-206.
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the Maryland side) as well as the troops in the Shenandoah
Valley, all of Maryland and Delaware.^

While Scott felt the

Mississippi River Valley was crucial to the defeat of the
South, McClellan thought Virginia the most important
theatre.

He agreed that Union strategy should include

operations in the western river valleys, as well as coastal
expeditions, but he believed that the decisive battles would
be fought in Virginia, under his command.

Following his

victory there, he intended to lead his army to New Orleans,
where he would mop up whatever was left of Rebel
resistance.8

But the first step would be to shape up his

Army and build defenses for the capital.
In public testimony McClellan noted that when he
arrived in Washington in July of 1861, "I found a very
unsatisfactory state of affairs.

The defenses of Washington

^McClellan, Report, 47-49; Idem, McClellan's Own Story,
113-14.
**Ibid, 226-27.
This statement refutes Reed's thesis
that McClellan had a cohesive overall strategy.
Reed, 3344. What he actually posited was an ego-centric Easternbased plan that focused all attention on himself and ignored
simple military exigencies (such as the need simultaneously
to open Union lines of communication along the South's
rivers and to cut the Confederates' lines), much less
political considerations.
McClellan, far from having a
strategic sense of the entire war, fully expected to bleed
Western armies to plump up the Army of the Potomac, which,
under his command, would then win the war.
In fact, it was
to be the campaigns in the West that wore down the
Confederacy, even before Sherman cut it in two.
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Figure 1. Defense fortifications of Washington, D.C.,
September, 1862. From Battles and Leaders, 2:543.
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were imperfect.”9

Privately he described the city as

absolutely defenseless and wrote his wife not to come to
Washington because it was not safe.10

To the Joint

Committee on the Conduct of the War (CCW) he explained,
"During the fall . . .

my general object [was] to place

Washington in a perfectly safe condition, and to organize an
army that might operate on any line of operations, leaving
Washington entirely secure."11
His first priority was fortifications.

Washington's

thirty-seven mile perimeter was to be protected by a system
of forty-eight works mounting 300 guns:
redoubts, and batteries.1^

forts, lunettes,

He assigned the task of

constructing these to Major John G. Barnard of the Corps of
Engineers, who set about it with high energy.

Disregarding

^McClellan before the Committee, 28 February 1862,
United States Congress--Joint Committee on the Conduct of
the W a r , The Army of the Potomac History of its Campaigns,
the Peninsula, Maryland, Fredericksburg, 3 VoIs (New York:
Tribune Assn., 1863), 1:2-3. Hereinafter referred to as
JCCW.
10McClellan, Report, 50-51; McClellan to Ellen Mary
McClellan, 18 August 1861, McClellan's Own Story, 88.
In
fact, the General thought it better to move the Federal
capital to New York, but realized this was not politically
feasible.
"The defence of the capital, containing, as it
did, the executive and legislature, the archives of the
government, the public buildings, the honor and prestige of
the nation, and, as time moved on, vast amounts of military
supplies, was a matter of vital importance, and it was
necessary to protect it not only from capture, but also
against insult."
Ibid., 93.
n JCCW, 2.
•^Leech, 139-140.
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fields, orchards, houses, and churches, he built rifle
trenches, earthworks and military roads.

The main forts

were placed half a mile apart, with twelve- to eighteen-foot
thick parapets on the exposed fronts.
abatis of cut and intertwined trees.

There were also
The exterior defense

line was extended south of the Potomac to cover the vital
port of Alexandria.

North of the capital the forts were

placed so as to command arteries of travel— the Rockville
Turnpike, Baltimore Turnpike and Railroad, the Seventh
Street road.

The Major built big field works and auxiliary

batteries on strategic points such as the ridge east of the
Anacostia River (Eastern Branch) and above the "receiving
reservoir" of the aqueduct, Washington's water supply.
With only twelve officers on his staff, by December
Barnard had constructed twenty-three forts south of the
Potomac, fourteen forts and three batteries between the
Potomac and the Anacostia, and eleven forts beyond the
Anacostia.

The works on the right bank of the Potomac were

larger, since they faced the more dangerous front.

Most

were enclosed earthworks, though several were lunettes with
stockaded gorges.

They were usually armed with twenty-four-

to thirty-two-pounders on seacoast carriages.

There was a

limited number of 24-pound siege guns, Parrott rifles and
lighter calibre field guns.

Magazines with a capacity of

one hundred pounds of ammunition were constructed in each
fort.

All in all, Barnard's system of forts was "larger,
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more numerous, more carefully built, and much more heavily
armed than those justly celebrated lines of Wellington" at
Torres Vedras, after which he modeled his works.1^
Meanwhile, McClellan began building his Army,

Cavalry

and artillery, he said, were "almost entirely neglected
until I assumed command."^

He used the Regular Army

infantry as the nucleus of reserves and tried for an
artillery ratio of two and a half pieces per 1000 men, three
per 1000 if possible.^

McClellan also reorganized his

staff and authorized Allan Pinkerton, head of a successful
private investigative firm, to establish a secret service to
gather intelligence for the Army.-^

Alexander, "The Peninsular Campaign," Atlantic
Monthly 13 (March 1864), 380. By the end of 1863 the
Washington defensive network included sixty forts, ninetythree batteries and 837 guns, manned by 23,000 men.
In the
connected system of works, every eight hundred to one
thousand yards there was an enclosed fort. Any important
approach or low ground not covered by a fort had a battery
to guard it. Everything was connected by rifle trenches
large enough for four ranks of men.
In the Spring of 1864,
when General Ulysses S. Grant called many from the
Washington defenses, they were replaced by semi-invalid
veteran reserves.
Thus, on 10 and 11 July, as Confederate
Jubal Early approached along the left bank of the Potomac,
there were only 9,000 troops to man the city's
fortifications. Cooling, 53-55.
-^McClellan

to Cameron, 8 September 1861, McClellan

Papers.
Ibidem, Report, 55-56.
16A 1 lan Pinkerton, The Spy of the Rebellion; Being a
True History of the Spy System of the United States Army
During the Late Rebellion.
Revealing Many Secrets of the
War Hitherto not Made Public (Hartford, Conn.: Chas. P .
Hatch, Publisher, 1886) , 245, 248.
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In a memo in late October to Cameron, McClellan
reported at least 150,000 Confederates on the Potomac,
"strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and
strongly intrenched."^
advance:

He listed requirements for an

for an active operations force, 150,000 men and

400 guns; for the Washington garrison, 35,000 men and 40
guns; to guard the Upper Potomac to Harpers Ferry, 5,000 men
and 12 guns; for the Lower Potomac, 8,000 men and 24 guns;
for the Baltimore-Annapolis garrison, 10,000 men and 12
guns.

That came to 208,000 men (or 240,000, to allow for

sickness, non-duty, etc.) and 488 guns.1®
McClellan's plans for a grand Caesarean prosecution of
the war were taking shape, but so far it was just that:
plans.

And there were others in the government with

different ideas on how to win the war.

■^The troop return for the entire Department of
Northern Virginia for November listed a total of 82,553
troops, or 51,943 present for duty, spread out over the
Potomac, Valley and Aquia Districts. OR 5:974.
18McClellan, Report, 46.

CHAPTER THREE
VILE CONTAGION

We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar,
And in the spirit of men there is no blood.
II, i

McClellan aside, probably few were pleased with the way
the war was going, but the Radicals were beside themselves.
The military stalemate was only part of it:

the political

and politico-military situation was all wrong.

In the

aftermath of Bull Run, Congress passed the Crittenden
Resolution, defining war aims in terms that set the
Radicals' teeth on edge: it was to be fought simply to
restore the Union status quo ante bellum, not to destroy
slavery.^

The Jacobins were not strong enough to stop this

declaration; they would have to gather forces in order to
marshal public opinion behind them.

The Democratic New York

Herald laid the Manassas failure on the Radicals' doorstep,
blaming the too-hasty action on their desire "to divert this
war from its legitimate objective . . . into an

^Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 3 2-3 3.
28
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exterminating crusade against Southern slavery."2

The

Radicals in turn attributed the defeat to a lack of fervor—
military, if not Executive.
Then there was the problem of Fremont, who, in his way
was to prove as sore a point to the Lincoln Administration
as McClellan was in his.

Pushed by the Radicals, in July

Lincoln appointed Fremont to the command of the Western
Department headquartered in Missouri.

It was an important

post, as Lincoln was trying desperately to hold onto the the
border states, but from beginning to end, Fremont bungled
it.

Charges of corruption and malfeasance were rife.

Yet

Lincoln hesitated to fire the Radical favorite, to the
disgust of his outspoken Attorney General.-^

Finally,

Fremont's military incompetence and political maladminis
tration outweighed the Radicals' support, and Lincoln
removed him from c o m m a n d . ^

223 July 1861, New York Herald, in Trefousse, Radical
Republicans, 174-75.
-^Writing his brother-in-law, Governor of Missouri,
Bates railed, "General Fremont is not to be removed— at
least until he has had a full opportunity to retrieve his
fortunes, or to ruin our state utterly and endanger our
cause." Bates to H.R. Gamble, 27 September 1861, in Allan
Nevins, Fremont, Pathmarker of the West (New York, London:
D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1939), 530n.
^Sandburg, War Years, 2:120. Radical pressure was such
that Lincoln was forced to replace Fremont with David
Hunter, another political general who was at least as
radical as Fremont.
Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 177.
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Meanwhile, there was another thorn in the Radicals'
side.

On 21 October, near Leesburg, Virginia, Colonel

Edward Baker was killed at the battle of Ball's Bluff.
Baker, former Senator from Oregon, Radical Republican and
friend of the President, was largely responsible for his own
death, for the political appointee was a military fool. But
the Radicals seized upon the battle and Baker's death as a
cause celebre, and, as with Bull Run, demanded inquiries to
find and punish those responsible for the Union losses.

The

immediate scapegoat was General Charles Stone, Baker's
commander at Ball's Bluff, but McClellan, who had issued
orders for an advance, was also implicated.
At first the Radicals had welcomed McClellan, Democrat
though he be, as someone who would take action, and they
supported him in his efforts to unseat Scott as General-inChief.

In October, he wrote his wife that he was conspiring

with Wade, Trumbull and Chandler to depose Scott.5

^McClellan to Ellen McClellan, 26 October 1861, in
George B. McClellan, The Civil War Papers of George B.
McClellan, Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen
W"I Sears, (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989) , 112.
Herinafter referred to as Civil War Correspondence. At the
same time, Scott was complaining to Cameron of McClellan's
insubordination.
"Has then a senior, no corrective power
over a junior officer in case of such persistent neglect and
disobedience?" he wondered.
A court martial would be in
order, he went on, except that a contest of authority would
be detrimental to the prosecution of the war.
Scott to
Cameron, 4 [?] October 1861, Papers of Edwin M. Stanton,
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
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Yet pressure was building on McClellan to take the
field with his growing Army.

In October, "the Jacobin

Club"--Trumbul1, Chandler and Wade--approached the General,
urging him to go to battle.
his reluctance.6

He resisted, blaming Scott for

The next day the same three "came up to

worry the administration into a battle," noted the
President's secretary.

Lincoln defended McClellan and

"deprecated" the new outbreak of impatience, but "at the
same time said it was a reality and must be taken into
account."^

Finally, the Radicals went to Seward and Cameron

in the same cause.®
By this time the Radicals were thoroughly disenchanted
with the administration.

Wade sniped to Chandler, "You

could not inspire Old Abe, Seward, Chase, or Bates with a
galvanic battery"? while Chandler wrote a friend that
Lincoln "means well but has no force of character.

He is

surrounded by Old Fogy [sic] Army officers more than half of
whom are downright traitors and the other one half
sympathize with the S o u t h . M o r e o v e r ,

both Wade and

6Hans L. Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade, Radical
Republican from Ohio (New York:
Twayne Publishers, Inc.,
1963) , 154 .
^26 October 1861, Hay, 31.
^Trefousse, Wade, 155.
^Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 179-180.
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Chandler had lost faith in McClellan.10

Winfield Scott had

also reached his limit; on 1 November, he retired, succeeded
by McClellan as General-in-Chief of Union forces.
But in December Congress convened, and the Radicals
gathered strength for their drive against Lincoln and
McClellan.11

On 4 December, the House rescinded the

Crittenden Resolution, thus repudiating the President's hope
that the war be fought solely to preserve the Union.

Then

what one historian called the "spearhead of the Radical
drive against the administration" was formed;
Committee on the Conduct of the W a r . 1^

the Joint

All except Chandler

(a merchant) were lawyers; none had military training or
experience.

Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode were

abolitionists and ardent supporters of Fremont.1^

Chandler

and Wade's idea of strategy was continual attack; all were

b a r r e n W. Hassler, Jr., General George B. McClellan
Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge, La.; Louisiana State
University Press, 1957), 32.
11Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 181.
•^williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 64. Williams
terms the committee "the unnatural child of lustful
radicalism and a confused conservatism." Only two of the
seven members were Democrats, Tennessee Senator Andrew
Johnson and New York Representative Moses F. Odell. The
other members were Chandler from the Senate and George W.
Julian of Indiana, Dan Gooch of Massachusetts, and John
Covode of Pennsylvania from the House of Representatives.
Ibid, 65.
-^William R. Pierson, "The Committee on the Conduct of
the Civil War," American Historical Review 23 (April 1918),
558.
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scornful of the idea that military expertise was anything
s p e c i a l . W e l l e s viewed them all as "extreme and violent
. . . implacable and revengeful" and thought them as
irrational as the secessionists themselves.^
Charged with inquiring into the conduct of the war, the
Committee was free to call any witness it chose.

Its

proceedings were secret, although they could be "leaked" as
it suited the Radicals; in some respects it acted as an
inquisition--ferreting out heretics in the military and
exposing their iniquities to the world at large.

Its

members had no legislative function but reported their
findings to the President or gave policy advice on the basis
of the military and ideological sins they had uncovered.^
Objects of their inquiry, such as General Stone, could be
brought before the CCW to defend military decisions without
knowing the charges against them or the testimony already
heard.

The CCW's powers were actually limited;

it could

question officials, but not dismiss or appoint them?
however, members did have i n f l u e n c e . - ^

14Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 72.
l^Welles, Lincoln's Administration, 71.
^Pierson, 560.
^Hans L. Trefousse, "The Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War; A Reassessment;" Civil War History 10
(1964) , 19 .
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The CCW was a weighty cross for Lincoln, although it
did have its usefulness in his schema:

he was willing to

move with the times, but was always conscious of the need
for the support of conservatives, especially in the border
states.

Therefore he used Radical pressure, through the

activities and pronouncements of the Committee, to push
"slow" generals and politicians.

For example, on 31

December, the CCW called on the President to demand action
on both the military and abolition fronts.

The next day,

Lincoln spoke to McClellan, mentioning the Committee's visit
in an attempt to encourage the General to move.^
On 23 December, the Committee called McClellan to
testify.

Ill (probably with typhoid), he did not appear.

But in rapid succession, many of his subordinates were
called.

J.P. Richardson, Samuel P. Heintzelman, William B.

Franklin, Montgomery C. Meigs, James S. Wadsworth, and
McDowell were only the f i r s t . H e i n t z e l m a n noted that the
roads in Northern Virginia were too "narrow and contracted"
to maneuver a force the size of the Army of the Potomac;
l®Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 182. Trefousse
elsewhere notes that the Committee's influence was actually
limited:
Lincoln took care of McClellen in his own good
time, not the CCW's.
Likewise in the cases of Fremont and
Butler:
though the darlings of the Radicals and their
Committee, Lincoln had the final say in whether the former
got a prize command or the latter stayed in New Orleans.
Idem, "Joint Committee," 15-16.
19Ibid., 13.
20JCCW, 1:70-71.

35
Franklin outlined the possibilities of an expedition to
Urbana, on the Rappahannock River.

He added that once the

Confederate Army had crossed the Rappahannock and burnt its
railroad bridge, a Federal attack across the river would be
too costly, and too easily defended by the Rebels.21
Meanwhile, Lincoln proposed that the Army of the
Potomac hold the Confederates at Centerville with 50,000
men, while another 50,000 flanked Johnston across the
Potomac at Occoquan Creek.^2

McClellan leisurely rejected

the suggestion, saying that he had "another plan of campaign
that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people ."^

But the General gave the

President no details and thus set the stage for future
frustrations.

Handicapped by his lack of military training,

Lincoln depended on his military advisors and commanders to
give him information needed to set strategic policy.

The

plan McClellan was entertaining was probably that vaguely
outlined by Franklin before the CCW— a move on Richmond from
the Lower Chesapeake, but he did not deign to explain it.
When McClellan brusquely rejected Lincoln's proposal without

^Heintzelman before CCW, 24 December, 1861, JCCW,
Report, 118?
Franklin before CCW, 26 December, 1861, Ibid.,
125-27.
^ L i n c o l n to McClellan, c. 1 December 1861, Abraham
Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P.
Basler (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Unviersity Press,
1953-1955), 5:34.

^McClellan, Civil War Correspondence, 143.

36
developing and presenting an alternative, he did his
campaign and his country a great disservice.24

The

President felt that "the military machine, both East and
West, was not only at a complete standstill, but was without
a programme."25

24Alexander S. Webb, The Peninsula, McClellan's
Campaign of 1862, vol. 3, Campaigns of the Civil War (New
York: Jack Brussel, Publisher, n.d.), 14-15.
25john G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A
History (New York:
Century Co., 1886-1890), 5:100.

CHAPTER FOUR
INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND WARNING
But it is doubtful yet
Whether Caesar will come forth to-day or no?
Hr i

On the sixth of January, the CCW met with the full
Cabinet to discuss McClellan.

They took no action but

recommended that McDowell replace McClellan.1

A few days

later, Bates urged--not for the first time--that Lincoln
simply take over military command; the President and Cameron
protested that the generals would not like such a course of
events.^

Lincoln sought further advice.

-'-Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 185.
210 January 1862, Edward Bates, The Diary of Edward
Bates, 1859-1866, ed. Howard K. Beale, vol. 4 of Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year
193 0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1933), 224. Bates had urged this for months:
Lincoln,
"being 'Commander in Chief' by law, he must command. . . .
The Nation requires it, and History will hold him
responsible." Bates also saw no reason for a General-inChief:
not only was there no general with experience with
large armies, this one told no one anything of his plans,
"so that the strange and dangerous fact exists, that the
Sec. of War and the Prest. are ignorant of the condition of
the army and its intended operations."
31 December, 1861,
Ibid., 218-19.
37
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On the advice of Quartermaster General Meigs, the
President called a war council of McDowell, Franklin, Chase,
Seward, and an Assistant Secretary of W a r . 3

Lincoln

described the pressures on him and recounted recent military
failures in the West.

What was to be done?

McDowell

recommended organizing the Army of the Potomac into corps
d 1armee and moving from Washington along railroad lines, all
of which led to the enemy's position.

Franklin suggested an

operation on the York River toward Richmond.

But since

neither general knew the condition of the Army of the
Potomac, the meeting was adjourned until the next night, so
they could look into it.
Blair,the only cabinet member with military expertise,
joined that meeting.

By now, McDowell and Franklin agreed

that if the question was of an immediate advance (which was
Lincoln's hope), the best movement now would not involve a
change of base (i.e., to the York River).

Blair stood up

for Franklin's Peninsula project— he thought it had a better
chance of significant victory.

Seward just wanted any win,

and Chase agreed that the moral power of any success would
suit the administration's p u r p o s e s . ^
^Cameron was conspicuous by his absence.
He had
finally been mired in his own malfeasance and was in the
process of being eased out of office and into the
Ambassadorship to Russia.
^In November, Chase had consulted with McClellen,
because he was finding it hard to sell government bonds—
investors were disinclined to back an Administration that at
best was not winning the war, and at worst might lose it.
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On the 12th, McClellan, having got wind of these
councils, was up and around; Lincoln announced they would
all meet with him the next day.-*
the previous lot.

An icy McClellan joined

He sat silently until Meigs pointed out

to him that the Commander-in-Chief had the right to hear his
plans for his armies.

McClellan eventually muttered that

Don Carlos Buell was set to advance soon in Kentucky, and
this seemed to be enough for Lincoln.

It was an ugly scene:

McClellan believed McDowell was conniving against him; Chase
blustered and blundered; Lincoln desperately sought some
reassurance that the military situation was under control;
and Meigs concluded that "McClellan would prefer to send
forward any other troops than those under his present
command."^
At about this same time, Cameron's activities had
finally put him beyond the pale.

The last straw was the War

Department's annual r e p o r t w h i c h contained a strongly-

On the basis of McClellan's assurances that the Army of the
Potomac would make a significant movement to Urbana, the
Treasury^Secretary was able to sell bonds. J.W. Schuckers,
The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase (New
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874), 445. Thus Chase apparently
knew of this plan although Lincoln did not.
^ i l l iam Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and
Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War,
1861-1865 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882) , 79-84.
^Montgomery C. Meigs, "General M.C. Meigs on the
Conduct of the Civil War," American Historical Review 26
(January 1921), 293.
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worded emancipation statement, issued to the press without
Lincoln s authorization.^

with a certain clumsiness,

Lincoln negotiated the Secretary of War's resignation and
appointed him Ambassador to Russia, effective the same day
as the final war council.

His replacement was to play a

much bigger role in the running of the war, and in the
upcoming campaign, than Cameron ever would have done.
Edwin M. Stanton's appointment as Secretary of War was
something of a surprise.

An anti-slavery Democrat, he had

served briefly in Buchanan's cabinet as Attorney General,
but upon Lincoln's taking office, Stanton returned to
private law practice and was a caustic critic of the new
administration.

Yet he saw some benefits of the present

conflict, as he noted just before the firing on Fort Sumter.
I do not think peaceful relations will continue
much longer. Nor indeed do I think hostilities
will be so great an evil as many apprehend. A
round or two often serves to restore harmony; and
the vast consumption required by a state of

7It must be remembered that Lincoln's overriding
concern was for the retention of the border states, and he
felt that a program of emancipation would alienate those in
these areas who would otherwise remain loyal. He also
doubted his ability to enforce any such policy. He only
succumbed to abolitionist/ Radical pressure to proclaim
limited emancipation after McClellan repulsed Lee at
Antietam late in 1862, whereupon there was trouble with many
soldiers, who declared that they had gone to war to restore
the Union, but would not fight for "niggers." Cameron's
statement in December, 1861, was therefore presumptuous,
premature and precipitate.
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hostilities will enrich rather than impoverish the
North.8
Of all Lincoln's coterie, Stanton "presented the
strangest medley of individual attributes," observed one
contemporary.

He respected the President's authority

because it was greater than his own; but he did not have a
high opinion of Lincoln's fitness for the position.9

The

Navy Secretary characterized Stanton as a zealous, devoted
and hard worker, adept at intrigue and able to influence
Congressional leaders; he was also "a hypocrite,
moral coward."^

[and] a

There were those who believed Stanton was

not "the gruff, disagreeable personage he is so generally
represented"; but Lincoln's own private secretary John Hay
once begged his confrere John G. Nicolay not to send him to

8Stanton to John A. Dix, 8 April 1861, in Drozdowski,
376. Stanton's rather Draconian viewpoint was further exem
plified by his support of the suspension of habeas corpus
and his attitude in the case of General Stone.
Stanton
remained unmoved by the general disgraced and ruined without
benefit of Consitutionally-guaranteed due process of law.
"To hold one commander in prison untried," he opined, "is
less harmful in times of great national distress than to
withdraw several good officers from active battle-fields to
give him a trial.
Individuals are nothing; we are contribu
ting thousands of them to save the Union, and General Stone
in [confinement in] Fort Lafayette is doing his share in
that direction." Frank A. Flower, Edwin McMaster Stanton
The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation and Reconstruction
(Akron, Ohio: Saalfield Publishing Company, 1905), 137.
9McClure, 157-58.
- ^ U n d a t e d entry, Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
ed., Howard K. Beale (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.,
1960), 1:68.
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Stanton to ask favors, for "I would rather make a tour of a
smallpox hospital."11
Stanton had clear views on power in general and the
Executive Office's exercise of it in particular.
He recognized no limit upon executive power in the
execution of the laws and the defense of the
Constitution.
Equally sure was he that there was
no other restraint upon the President's powers as
the supreme military commander than were to be
found in the Articles of War and the Usages of
Nations .^
As Secretary of War, Stanton felt he was Commander-in-Chief.
He yielded only to Lincoln's a u t h o r i t y . H e had nothing
but contempt for professional soldiers and enjoyed his power
over t h e m . 14

Attorney General Bates decided early on that,

as far as generals were concerned, Stanton would "assuredly
speak to them in orders. " ^

And a foreign military observer

noted that Stanton was "instrumental, more than any one
else, in developing in Mr. Lincoln's mind the idea of

-^Frederick Milnes Edge, Major-General McClellan and
the Campaign on the Yorktown Peninsula (London: Trubner &
Co., 1865), 63; Allan N e v m s , The War for the Union (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons~, i960) , 2:35 .
l^George C. Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin
M. Stanton (Boston & New York:
Houghton, Mifflin & Co.,
1899), 327.
13McClure, 162.
14Wi lliams, Lincoln and the Generals, 57.
1^2 February 1862, Bates, 228. This, of course, was
only as it should be, to Bates's way of thinking.
Lincoln
was the Commander-in-Chief; Stanton the President's
lieutenant.
Bates never ceased urging Lincoln to command.
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directing military operations in person, from the depths of
the White House."18
Throughout the fall and winter of 1861, Stanton
cultivated McClellan.

"Success was always Stanton's

touchstone, and McClellan's star seemed to be rising
irresistibly."17

As early as October, after Cameron made an

abolition speech to a newly-arrived regiment, McClellan
reported that Stanton urged him to arrest the War Secretary
for inciting to insubordination and advocated the General
seizing the government and becoming dictator.18

Soon

McClellan was writing to his wife that in order to get any
work done he had to escape to Stanton's house "to dodge all
enemies in shape of 'browsing' Presidents etc. . . ."l9

It

was Stanton who had advised McClellan of the President's war

18Philippe, Comte de Paris, "McClellan's Organizing the
Grand Army," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed.
Clarence C. Buel & Robert U. Johnson (New York, Century
Press, 1887-1888) 2:120.
17Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton:
The
Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York,
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 131. There is no definitive
biography of Stanton, which is a loss to any study of the
Civil War. This and the Gorham and Flowers works are all
that is available in published form? they are individually
and collectively lacking.
Drozdowski's dissertation, more
than 1000 pages long, was to have been only the first part
of a complete study of Lincoln's War Secretary; but
evidently the rather ambitious project was never completed.
18McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 152.
19Mc C 1ellan to Ellen McClellan, sometime in October or
November, 1861, McClellan Papers.
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conferences in January, warning him, "They are counting on
your death, and are already dividing among themselves your
military goods and chattels."20
Soon after taking office, however, Stanton became a
"convert" to the Radical cause.^

He was not a hypocrite in

this respect, said one observer, but genuinely changed his
beliefs after gaining power:

he was "a sound and sincere

friend, political and personal, of the men who showered
their favors on his head."22

Horace Greeley's New York

Tribune and William Cullen Bryant's New York Post, both
Radical/abolitionist in slant, defended Stanton's
appointment:
and Trumbull.

he was, after all, approved by Wade, Fessenden
Even the Democratic New York Herald on 14

January gave Stanton credit for "a strong head, clean hands,
and a pure heart,"22

Fessenden commented on his first

meeting with the new War Secretary that "we agreed perfectly
on all points.

If he acts up to his promises, he will be

just the man for Secty of War."2^

Stanton began immediately

to cultivate the Radicals of Congress and continued this
2^Idem, McClellan's Own Story, 155.
2-4ienry L. Dawes, "Recollections of Stanton under
Lincoln," Atlantic Monthly 25 (February 1894), 167.
22Jeremiah S. Black, "Senator Wilson and Edwin M.
Stanton," Galaxy 9 (June 1870), 823.
22Drozdowski, 559-60; 540.
2^Fessenden to Chase, 15 January 1862, Papers of Salmon
P. Chase, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
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practice throughout the war and beyond.

It seems clear that

he befriended and encouraged McClellan while the latter was
in the ascendancy and favor was to be accrued through
association with him.

Then, when Stanton had achieved power

of his own, he could afford to turn on McClellan,
particularly at a time when the General was coming under
attack.
Almost immediately after Stanton's appointment,
McClellan began to notice a change in his erstwhile
supporter.

Later, he was to date the start of his troubles

from Stanton's taking office, claiming the new Secretary
"did many things to break up the free and confidential
intercourse that had heretofore existed between the
President and m y s e l f . T h i s

statement is as much a

commentary on McClellan's grasp of the situation as it is on
Stanton's activities.

Nonetheless, Stanton was not without

his use as a catspaw, as far as Lincoln was concerned.

It

would seem that the President put up with Stanton's
machinations because he brought order to a chaotic War
Department, could be useful in dealing with the Radicals,
and was one man who could bear the consequences of costly
decisions and unpopular actions.

When friends remonstrated

with the President over Stanton's propensity to pre-empt
power, Lincoln observed that he might eventually have to

^George B. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign," in
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2:163-64.
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"put bricks in [Stanton's] pockets," but in the meantime,
the Secretary could safely be allowed to jump about.26
But the Radicals were not quiescent.

There was an

active public campaign against "bad" cabinet members and
generals and continuing pressure to invade the South.

As

one Radical put it, "We want the army to kill somebody."27
In the absence of strategic confidences from his General-inChief, Lincoln succumbed.

The President's General War Order

No. 1 and Special War Order No. 1, mandated a general
movement of all Union forces by 22 February and directed
that, after first providing for the defense of Washington,
the Army of the Potomac was to move toward Manassas
Junction.

These two orders seemed to undermine McClellan

and raised the Radicals' hopes for deposing

h i m .

28

The

immediate danger to McClellan was slight; Lincoln still
expressed confidence in him and was only frustrated by the
thought of, in essence, having his Army all dressed up with
no place to go.29

Yet they were an indication of the limits

on the President's patience.

^Sandburg, War Years, 2:149-50.
27G.S. Ward to Fessenden, 23 January 1862, in Williams,
Lincoln and the Radicals, 80-81.
2^Drozdowski, 716-18.
2^Orville H. Browning, The Diary of Orville Hickman
Browning, eds. Theodore C. Pease & James G. Randall
(Springfield, 111.:
Illinois State Historical Library,
1925), 1:525.

Lincoln clearly favored direct movement and was equally
forthright in his concern for the security of the capital.
Yet in response to a query from the President regarding the
relative merits of his and the General's plans, McClellan
dismissed Washington as a base of operations, since from
there it was too hard to attack the enemy at his presumed
weak points.

The Confederates were in a strong central

position, and the weather had made roads in Northern
Virginia impassable.
In contrast, using the Lower Chesapeake Bay as a base
of operations would be better because it would force the
Rebels to move from around Manassas to defend Richmond and
Norfolk.

The Rebel capital was a mere sixty miles west on a

railroad line from West Point, with better terrain.
Moreover this plan would put the Army of the Potomac in the
position of deciding the place and disposition of battle.
If there should be a defeat or setback, it would have a safe
base in Fortress Monroe and the fleet.

Further, a

Peninsular attack would open up the Carolinas and Georgia,
making it easier to reduce all southern ports, cut
communications, and take the Mississippi River, breaking off
Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas.^

This plan of attack would

to McClellan, 3 February 1862, in McClellan,
Report, 97-98; McClellan to Stanton, 3 February 1862, Ibid.,
^Lincoln

98- 1 0 7 .
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not endanger Washington, McClellan said, but he did not
elaborate on how this should be so.31
To the General's mind, his plan made perfect sense—
militarily.

But he did not consider either the political or

the psychological side of Lincoln's query.

Washington must

not only be safe, it must be seen to be safe.

Lincoln was

grappling with domestic pressure from all sides--Democrats
to Radicals— as well as trying to prevent foreign powers
from allying with or supporting the Confederacy.

It was

vital that the nation's capital be (or perhaps more
important, seem) inviolable.

If political considerations

made him unreasonable about this issue, it behooved the
General-in-Chief who was charged with the overall management
of the war to reassure his President that proper precautions
had been taken.

But McClellan did not do this, and an

important command link between the military and civil
authorities was thereby broken.
Meanwhile, Bates noted the turmoil and discontent
pervading Washington, and predicted that it was bound to
shake up the administration.

He attributed this to

McClellan's inactivity.32
^McClellan to Stanton, 3 February 1862, in McClellan,
Civil War Correspondence, 169.
32Bates diary entry, 3 February 1862, in Hendricks,
299. At the same time the Attorney General was uneasy about
the CCW's delivering its report on General Stone and Ball's
Bluff to Stanton.
"I feared the establishment of precedent
for congressional interference with the command of the army,
which might lead to the terrible results seen in France, in
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But there was movement in the West.

victories at Forts

Henry and Donelson in Tennessee raised northern morale and
made Lincoln somewhat more inclined to indulge the General's
campaign plan.

They also created a climate of antagonism

between McClellan and Stanton.

Northern armies could move,

and southern armies could be defeated.
Army of the Potomac stagnant?

Why, then, was the

The antagonism erupted in the

press, with the New York Herald leading the pack for
McClellan and the Tribune (among others) backing Stanton.^3
McClellan later charged that Stanton hereupon embarked
on a deliberate campaign to sabotage the General's plans.34
If this was the case, one opening salvo might have been a
letter of 20 February that Stanton sent to the New York
Tribune in which he pointedly jabbed at McClellan's muchtouted success in organizing and training the Army of the
Potomac.

Progress in the war, the Secretary declared, was

not due to "military combinations and organizing victory,"
but to "the Spirit of the Lord" which inspired and moved
Union soldiers and rattled the Confederates.

Stanton went

on to blast the "stupendous and solemn folly in the Cabinet"

the days of the revolution," he wrote.
Bates, Diary, 229.

3 February 1862,

•^Drozdowski, 643.
34McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195.
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that supported such a belief in organization, which could
not infuse confidence into the p e o p l e . 35
Another shot was the organization of the Army of the
Potomac into corps d'armee.
several ways.

This issue was crucial in

Generally, even military men agreed that in

armies the size of those currently being fielded, there
needed to be some sort of extra-divisional organization:

it

was simply not feasible to break up command into so many
pieces.

But many of McClellan's senior generals— the ones

likeliest to be made corps commanders— were also those most
inclined to give him trouble:

they were older than he and

often Republican (some political appointees), unlike the
A

younger, Democratic generals, most of whom owed their rank
and position to McClellan himself.

So McClellan had said

over and over that he wished to make the determinations as
to command after he led the army into the field and could
evaluate the division commanders'

leadership abilities.

■^John C. Ropes, "General McClellan's Plans for the
Campaign of 1862, and the Alleged Interference of the
Government with Them," paper read before the Military
Historical Society of Massachusetts, 13 November 1876, in
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, The Peninsular
Campaign of General McClellan in 1862:
Papers Read before
the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876~T~
1877, 1878 and 1880 (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 18 81),
1:19-21.
Hereinafter referred to as MHSM 1.
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Radicals and Stanton pushed the reorganization precisely
because the senior generals— all friendly to the Radical
cause— would get the corps commands.^
Stanton also secretly embarked upon a campaign to
induce the aging General Ethan Allen Hitchcock to replace
McClellan.

This was passing strange, considering the

general was not only 63 years old, but in extreme illhealth.

Hitchcock himself was appalled that Stanton would

imagine him capable of field command, even though Stanton
said that he and Lincoln were hard put to withstand the
demands for McClellan's removal.37

Hitchcock refused

command but agreed to remain in Washington to advise the
Secretary (and President).
On 20 February, Willie Lincoln, 11, died after a fourweek bout with typhoid.
was also very ill.38

The President's youngest son Tad

The personal tragedy must have weighed

on Lincoln's mind, perhaps sapping him of the energy

3^Trefousse, Wade, 167-68.
3^15 March 1862, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Fifty Years in
Camp and Field, Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen
Hitchcock, U.S.A., ed. W.A. Croffut (New York & London:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, 1909), 438-39.
Stanton had lured Hitchcock to the capital claiming that the
President wanted the benefit of the General's experience;
Hitchcock was reluctant— he was unfit for service, being
bedridden even as Stanton made his appeal.
The General
concluded, "On the whole, I am uncomfortable, I am almost
afraid that Secretary Stanton hardly knows what he wants,
himself."
Ibid., 439.
3®Browning, 1:530.
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necessary to press for clear answers from McClellan, fend
off Radical demands, or curb his War Secretary.39
The situation was exacerbated at the end of February,
when McClellan's attempt to retake Harpers Ferry and rebuild
the railroad bridge there was foiled by the belated
discovery that his transports were six inches too wide for
the canal locks.

He looked foolish, and the Radicals

pressured Lincoln to rein in M c C l e l l a n . ^0
counsel for the nonce.

Lincoln held his

But events in March were to force

his hand.

39Stanton complained that he was ready to move militarily,
but he could only do so through the President, who was distraught
over his sons' illness.
16 February 1862, Stanton to Chase,
Papers of Salmon P. Chase, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division.
^Drozdowski, 665-66.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISTURBED SKY

Beware the ides of March I
I / ii
On 8 March, Lincoln called McClellan to his office to
tell him that he was displeased with the outcome of the
Harpers Ferry foray and that there was a rumor making the
rounds to the effect that McClellan's plan to change his
base of operations was a treasonous conspiracy to leave
Washington defenseless.^

McClellan of course bridled at

such a suggestion and, in the words of one historian,
decided on a flanking maneuver around the President's
concerns about the Peninsula Campaign.2
He convened a meeting of his division commanders and
General Randolph B. Marcy, his chief of staff and father-in-

^-McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195-96
McClellan
attributed Lincoln's aspersions on the Harpers Ferry
situation to Stanton's malevolence.
He claimed that the
Secretary lied to him regarding Lincoln's understanding and
acceptance of McClellan's explanation of those events and
that this interview was, in effect, the fruit of Stanton's
campaign to undermine his relationship with the Commanderin-Chief.
McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195-96.
Drozdowski, using Heintzelman's journal and Stanton papers
lists this as 7 March.
Drozdowski, 670-71.
2Drozdowski, 670-71.
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law.

Marcy outlined both plans of advance, Urbana and

Manassas.

Erasmus D. Keyes, Andrew Porter, Fitz-John

Porter, William B. Franklin, William F. Smith, Henry M.
Naglee, George M. McCall, and Louis Blenker approved the
Urbana plan; Heintzelman, McDowell, John G. Barnard, and
Edwin V. Sumner opposed it.3
Lincoln was reluctant to face down the preference of
McClellan and eight generals, but Stanton argued that the
vote figures were skewed:

each of the eight approving

generals owed his rank to McClellan.

Only those independent

of the Commanding General's patronage had voted the merits
of the plan.

Therefore he urged Lincoln to refuse

authorization for the change of operational b a s e /

But

Lincoln as a civilian did not want responsibility for a
military failure if he overruled M c C l e l l a n . ^
That same day, the Confederate Navy sent the ironclad
CSS Virginia into the Federal blockade fleet at Hampton
Roads inflicting severe losses.

This caused a great stir in

Washington? even McClellan was upset.

The fear was that the

^Gorham, 345-46.
^Gorham, 346-48.
^Drozdowski, 674-75.
The last time he did this
resulted in the defeat at Bull Run.
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Virginia1s seeming indestructibility would give it the power
to attack with impunity whatever it pleased.6
Other events were moving to shape the General's plans.
On the 8th also came word that Confederate General Joseph E.
Johnston had withdrawn his troops from around Manassas and
Centreville and pulled back behind the Rappahannock.

Though

he claimed the impassable roads made pursuit impossible, the
next day McClellan decided to march his Army to the
abandoned Confederate positions as a sort of shake-down
sortie— a practice exercise preparatory to the real
advance.7

What he found there caused a furor:

at least

some of the Confederate defenses consisted of logs painted

fi

DBrowning, 1:532.
Stanton, in particular, was spooked.
Welles left an especially rich account of his confrere's
reaction.
"The Merrimac, he said, would destroy every
vessel in the service— could lay every city on the coast
under contribution— could take Fortress Monroe— McClellan's
[mistaken] purpose to advance by the Peninsula must be
abandoned. . . .Likely the first movement would be to come
up the Potomac and disperse Congress, destroy the Capitol
and public buildings, or she might go to New York and Boston
and destroy those cities, or levy from them contributions
sufficient to carry on the war." Welles replied that it was
unlikely that the Confederate ironclad could be everywhere
at once, and the newly-built Union ironclad Monitor would
prove to be an adequate check.
Stanton, however, was
unimpressed when he learned that the Monitor had but two
guns:
"His mingled look of incredulity and contempt cannot
be described," Welles noted. Later that same day, Welles
scuttled an attempt by Stanton to sink boats in the Potomac
to halt the anticipated assault by the Virginia on
Washington's public buildings.
Undated entry, Welles,
Diary, 63-64, 66-67.
Such a project would have obstructed
the channel, which McClellan needed open and would in fact
have bottled up Washington.
^McClellan, Report, 118-119.
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and propped up to resemble artillery pieces--"Quaker" guns.
All along, McClellan had insisted that his opponents were
numerous and well-armed and that he did not have enough men
to attack them; this evidence seemed to refute his claims.
Coming so soon after the debacle at Harpers Ferry, the
discovery made McClellan look doubly incompetent.
While on maneuvers in Manassas, McClellan received the
news— in the press— that Lincoln had relieved him as
General-in-Chief.^

At the same time, the President created

the Mountain Department west of the Alleghenies, under the
command of Fremont, and the Department of the Mississippi
under Halleek.^

All commanders of departments were

instructed to "report severally and directly" to Stanton.
War Order No. 2 directed that the Army of the Potomac was to
make no change in base of operations "without leaving in,
and about Washington, such a force as, in the opinion of the
General-in-Chief, and the commanders of all the army corps,

^Paris, 122.
^President's General War Order No. 3. OR 5:54. The
Fremont appointment was purely the result of Radical
pressure.
In the early part of the year, Fremont appeared
before the CCW, and convinced them that the charges against
him with respect to his Missouri command were groundless.
Nevins, Fremont, 552-54.
In March, Wade leaked the full
text of the General's testimony to the press; and all over
the North newspapers rallied behind him.
The Senator
believed there must be total war in order to break the slave
power; McClellan was not going to provide this, and there
must be extraordinary men for extraordinary times.
To Wade
and the other Radicals, Fremont was just the sort of general
needed.
Trefousse, Wade, 176-77.
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shall leave said city entirely secure.”

Additional

conditions included clearing the Confederate batteries on
the Lower Potomac and commencing movement within ten days .^
There was more.
This order also reorganized the Army of the Potomac
into corps, assigning the new commands to the senior
generals as a matter of course.

McDowell took command of I

Corps' four divisions, Sumner of II Corps, Heintzelman of
III Corps, and Keyes of IV Corps— each with three divisions.
These were to constitute the Army of the Potomac's field
operations force.

The troops assigned to the defense of

Washington went to James S. Wadsworth, Military Governor of
the District, and V Corps, operating on the upper Potomac,
went to Nathaniel P. Banks.^
political appointees.

Both Banks and Wadsworth were

McClellan particularly inveighed

against Wadsworth's assignment to such a crucial and highvisibility command, which required a skilled military man—
Franklin would be better.

But Stanton sanguinely told him

■^President's General War Order No. 2, 8 March 18 62,
Stanton Papers.
Lincoln had discussed this with Stanton,
Chase and Seward.
Seward urged that the directive be issued
in Stanton's name in order to strengthen public confidence
in him.
But Stanton demurred:
considering his publicly
perceived vendetta against the General, it would seem as
though personal animosity had sparked such instructions.
The President took responsibility for issuing the order.
11
March 1862, Hay, 37-38.
Drozdowski claims that not wanting
to give Fremont the Mountain Department command was a factor
in Stanton's reluctance to sign the order.
Drozdowski, 695.
^-President's General War Order No. 2, Stanton Papers.
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that it must be Wadsworth because the Administration needed
to "conciliate the agricultural interests of New York."12
Johnston's withdrawal behind the Rappahannock forced
McClellan to move his proposed campaign to the York-James
Peninsula

(if he still wanted to flank the Confederates),

using Fortress Monroe as his base of operations.

This did

not offer quite such glowing prospects for victory, but once
the Navy had cleared the James River and reduced the
Confederate batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point on
the York, the Army of the Potomac's lines of communications
would be entirely secure.

It still presented the advantages,

of a direct, unexpected route to the Confederate capital and
better roads than Lincoln's proposed advance via Manassas.
On 13 March, McClellan convened a council of corps
commanders at Fairfax Court House for the purpose of
deciding what force should be left at Washington to meet the
requirement of War Order No. 3.

The commanders agreed

unanimously on a Peninsula plan of operations, with the
provisos that the Virginia be neutralized, there be adequate
transport, and that "the force to be left to cover
Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of
security for its safety from menace."

To Keyes,

12McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 226. Wadsworth,
who had supported Lincoln over Seward in I860,-would become
the (unsuccessful) Greeleyite anti-slavery Republican
candidate for Governor of New York in the Fall of 1862.
Alden Hatch, The Wadsworths of the Genessee (New York:
Coward-McCann^ Inc. , 1959) , 76-77, WT~.
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Heintzelman, and McDowell, this meant that "with the forts
on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those
on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the
Virginia line of 25,000 men should suffice."
this number should be 40,000.13

Sumner felt

in the face of such

unanimity, Lincoln agreed to the plan, but repeated that
McClellan must "leave such force at Manassas Junction as
shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not
reposess himself of that position and line of
communication," and that, again, Washington must be safe.14
The Manassas requirement was an odd demand, "a measure not dictated by any sound military consideration."^

And as

for Washington's security, McClellan felt that this (as well
as the safety of the Manassas line) was an obvious benefit
of his advance along the Peninsula.

First, when Johnston

pulled back behind the Rappahannock, he destroyed the
railroad bridges necessary for any new advance on the
■^McDowell to Stanton, Report of Council of Corps
Commanders, 13 March 1862, Stanton Papers.
McClellan
intended at this point to leave 66,552 men at Washington,
Baltimore and the Shenandoah Valley; new arrivals would
bring this number to 77,401? or 57,091 present for duty,
less Dix's command at Fort Monroe, but with the convalescent
hospitals to draw upon. This, of the total Army of the
Potomac present for duty of 203,213, based on the 1 March
return.
An estimate of the Washington garrison (made 21
October 1861 by Barnard and Barry) was 34,000.
Thus from
the beginning the General counted on 23,000 troops assigned
to the Valley.
McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 163-64.
14Stanton to McClellan, 13 March, McClellan Papers.
^Swinton, 95.
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Manassas line.

If he should somehow manage to recross the

river, Union cavalry patrols would give sufficient warning
to dispose troops to repel him.

Second, immediately upon

learning of the Army of the Potomac's movement up the
Peninsula, Johnston would have to withdraw any remaining
forces from Northern Virginia in order to meet the assault.
Finally, "surrounded as Washington was with numerous and
strong fortifications well garrisoned, it was manifest that
the enemy could not afford to detach from his main army a
force sufficient to assail them."^

Even war correspondent

Frederick Edge, who was willing to believe almost any
scurrilous tale about McClellan, dismissed the idea of the
Army occupying Johnston's old Manassas forts, for "the chain
of batteries round Washington is ample to defend the city,

Report, 142-43. As it happens, there was
a serious proposal by a Confederate general to take
advantage of the removal of the bulk of McClellan's troops
to attack Washington. On 14 April, Confederate President
Jefferson Davis met with his new War Secretary, Johnston,
and Generals G. W. Smith, James Longstreet and Robert E.
Lee.
Reporting on the Peninsula defense situation, Johnston
said he felt the front would have to be abandoned.
Smith
recommended garrisoning Richmond and letting McClellan lay
siege to the capital while the preponderance of Johnston's
forces attacked Washington and Baltimore or Philadelphia and
New York, with the cooperation of General Thomas J.
Jackson's Valley army. Longstreet also proposed holding
McClellan before Yorktown while the main army marched on
Washington via the Shenandoah Valley. Eventually, however,
Davis decided to face the Federals on the Peninsula.
Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command
(New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970) , 1:148-51.
■^McClellan,
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and it is scarcely likely that the enemy will return, having
once quitted."I7
McClellan set about arranging for the defenses of
Washington.

On 16 March, his Adjutant General, Seth

Williams, wrote Wadsworth about the number and disposition
of the troops in the newly-created Military District of
Washington (MDW).

The geographical limits of MDW were the

cities of Washington and Alexandria, the defense works south
of the Potomac from Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the
post of Fort Washington.

Banks was to command at Manassas

Junction, but Wadsworth should nevertheless "exercise
vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in
that quarter and maintain the duties of advanced guards,"
and also take care to protect flank approaches.

All troops

not necessary to police Washington and Georgetown or to
garrison forts north of the Potomac should be moved south of
the river.

Wadsworth was instructed to post his main body

of troops in the center of his front and to distribute
"proper proportions at suitable distances" on either flank.
He was to use patrols, urge troops to maintain the forts and
arms and keep up training and discipline.

He was also to

look to the security of ferries, railroads and canals.

17Edge, 18.

And
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he was responsible for all new troops— forming them into
provisional brigades, and training and equipping them.-^
The same day, McClellan ordered Banks to provide for
the defense of Manassas.

He was to entrench his force there

and take positions at Centreville and Strasburg.

He would

repair railroad bridges and blockhouses between Washington
and Strasburg, set out grand guards at Warrenton and in
advance of his lines, and keep his cavalry well to the
front.

He was to develop good intelligence and cover the

line of the Potomac and Washington.19

Banks had been in the

Shenandoah Valley to try to push out Confederate forces
under Major General Thomas J. Jackson, but McClellan felt
that the Valley was now secure enough that he could redeploy
Banks' corps in Manassas in order to allay the President's
uneasiness.20
Banks prepared to withdraw down the Valley toward
Harpers Ferry to comply with his new orders.

But on 23

March, as McClellan began embarking troops for Fort Monroe,
Jackson attacked a Onion force under James Shields at
Kernstown.

Though repulsed tactically, Jackson achieved a

strategic victory, in that his assault forced Banks to

■^Williams to Wadsworth, 16 March 1862.
Papers of
Abraham Lincoln, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
-*-9McClel lan to Banks, 16 March 1862.
War Correspondence, 212.
20Webb, 89-90.

McClellan, Civil
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cancel plans to evacuate the Valley.

McClellan's "Manassas"

force would now remain along the Shenandoah.
At the time, Kernstown seemed a fortunate opportunity
to capture Jackson or drive him permanently from the Valley,
securing the B & 0 Railroad and communications into Eastern
Tennessee, where Lincoln was anxious to render support to
the pocket of loyalists who resided there.

It was also a

second chance for Fremont to make his military mark.
As commander of the Mountain Department, Fremont was
responsible for guarding the B & 0 and seizing the railroad
between Richmond and Knoxvil le.2-*- Stanton had opposed
Fremont's appointment, seconded by Hitchcock, who described
Fremont as "the willing idol of a party whose design is to
pervert the constitutional power of the government to
revolutionary purposes."22
make the kill in the Valley.

The Radicals wanted Fremont to
The CCW conferred with

Stanton, urging him to detach Louis Blenker's division from
the Army of the Potomac and send it to the Mountain

^Thomas to Fremont, 22 March 1862, OR 7, pt. 3:8.
2223 March 1862, Hitchcock, 440-41. The hostility of
the War Secretary became so well known that Horace Greeley
urged the President to intervene. The issue, he said, was
not whether or not Fremont was a great general, but that
"our loyal people, with scarcely an exception, are anxious
that he should be permitted to show what he is." If Lincoln
did not give Fremont full latitude, "it will generally be
thought that he has been crippled, and the government will
be blamed for whatever ill [?] fortune [?] may befallPray
look to this." Greeley to Lincoln, 16 March, 1862, in
Lincoln, 5:169n.
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Department.

Although antipathetic to Fremont, Stanton was

willing to aid the Radicals, but with McClellan supported
enthusiastically by the Democrats, Lincoln did not relish
the consequences of depriving him of Blenker.23

There were

also rumors that the Radicals were using Lincoln to get
McClellan.

Bates warned the President that "extreme men in

Congress were lying in wait against him," especially
regarding McClellan.24
Hitchcock suggested that Lincoln send Fremont only ^
enough troops to protect the B & 0, using others to
reinforce McClellan's right, which was open to attack by theConfederates "who, though not likely to take it, might be
invited by its weakness to make some desperate attempt
similar to one already made by Jackson upon Shields."2^
However, the Radicals were implacable:
reinforced.

Fremont must be

Stanton was eager to accommodate the ultras.

Based, he noted, on McClellan's own figures, he recommended
sending 19,500 troops to Fremont (8,500 under Blenker, 9,000
under Hooker, plus three cavalry regiments, four batteries
of artillery and two pontoon trains).

That would leave

McClellan the force already at Fort Monroe, 80,000;

22Trefousse, Radicals, 192, 196.
2415 March 1862, Bates, 240-41.
^Hitchcock to Lincoln, 30 March 1862, OR 12, pt.
1:229-30.
Hitchcock did not specify the location of "the
right", but probably was referring to Manassas.

McDowell's corps, 34,000; Richardson's Division, 8,000; and
5,500 cavalry volunteers— for a total of 127,500.

There

would remain at Washington 3,300 regular cavalry, 4,200
regular infantry, 12,000 volunteer infantry, 110 guns, and
two pontoon trains.

He listed about 8,000 troops in the

Baltimore-Annapolis area, which could presumably be called
u p o n .

26

with everything so clearly provided for, he

concluded, Hooker and Blenker could easily be spared.
Lincoln, perhaps heeding Greeley's advice, finally
agreed to send Blenker only, and informed McClellan of the
detachment, assuring him that this division would be the
last troops taken from the Peninsula operation.
President told McClellan,

The

"If you could know the full

pressure of the case," he would understand; McClellan later
insisted that this pressure "was only a political one to
swell Fremont's command."27

<phe General remonstrated with

the President and Secretary, but the best he could negotiate
was Stanton's authorization to redeploy Blenker in the

2^Stanton to Lincoln, 30 March 1862, Stanton Papers.
Stanton calculated 80,750 as already having arrived at Fort
Monroe, with 67,000 yet to be transported (including the
troops of Blenker and Hooker that he wanted transferred to
Fremont). He counted Banks as part of the force left in
Washington, although this may be based on the assumption
that Banks would shortly be at Manassas instead of in the
Valley.
He appears to have entirely disregarded Sumner's
Corps in his summary.
^ L i n c o l n to McClellan, 31 March 1862, Lincoln, 5:17576; McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 165.
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Valley with Banks, as long as he was in a position to
reinforce Fremont.^8
Meanwhile, the defense network south of the Potomac was
inspected, with the following report:

Fort Barnard had

eight guns; armament, ammunition, parapets slopes, and
abatis were fine.

Fort Richardson had nine guns; one mortar

was unserviceable and one magazine leaked.

Arms,

ammunition, parapets, and abatis were in good condition.
Fort Albany, with twelve guns, had thin parapets, but arms
and ammunition were acceptable.

Forts Craig and

Tillinghurst had seven guns each, all in good order.

These -

five fortresses were occupied by the 14th Massachusetts
Volunteers.

The troops were not yet fully drilled.

Fort

Cass's five guns, arms, ammunition and physical plant were
all in good condition.

It was garrisoned by a fully trained

company (seventy-four men) of the Wisconsin Heavy Artillery.
Fort Woodbury had five guns.

Its slopes were caving in, and

one magazine was flooded; everything else was fine.

It was

not garrisoned,^ however; only one sergeant and two sentinels
were stationed there.

Fort Dekalb likewise had nine guns,

but no garrison; an ordnance sergeant and two sentinels were
in residence.

Its slopes were washing away, but arms,

ammunition, and abatis were in good condition.

Whatever

troops garrisoned these two forts would require training.

28stanton to McClellan, 31 March 1862, OR, 5:62.
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An artillery officer should coordinate it all, the
inspectors recommended; and they concluded that the works
were in good condition, considering the season.
McClellan notified Banks— clearly still believing V
Corps would soon take up positions around Manassas— that the
Confederates had retreated across the Rappahannock,
destroying the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station.
There was no trace of the enemy north of the river, and they
had deserted Fredricksburg.

He predicted that Johnston

would not reinforce Jackson for any offensive in the Valley;
the scene of action would soon shift to the Peninsula.30
With this, finally glad to be away from the sink of
iniquity that he had found Washington to be, McClellan on 1
April embarked at Alexandria for Fort Monroe.

In an effort

to assure the President that Washington was indeed "entirely
secure", one of his final acts before departing was to
outline his provisions for the capital's defense;

Dix had

6,800 at Baltimore, Annapolis and the Eastern Shore; Fort
Delaware was "very well garrisoned" with 400 men.
Washington forts were manned by 10,600, with "other
disposable troops" under Wadsworth's command amounting to
11,400.

There were 3,359 railroad guards in Maryland, who

2%.B. Sweitzer to Colonel D.B. Sackett, Inspector
General, 29 March 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:29-30.
•^McClellan to Banks, 1 April 1862, in McClellan, Civil
War Correspondence, 220.
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should be relieved by dismounted cavalry and sent to
Manassas

(since they were "old regiments" and therefore fit

for critical assignments).

He also requested that some

3,500 troops being raised in Pennsylvania and any others
from New York and other eastern states be sent to Manassas,
along with 4,000 from Wadsworth's command.

Warrenton's

force totaled 7,780, with 12 pieces of artillery.

If all

this were done, there would be 18,639 men under
Abercrombie's command at and around Manassas.
Blenker was to be moved from Warrenton to Strasburg
(from the Rappahannock line to the Valley), remaining there
"long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in
that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination"
(the Mountain Department).

Thus, troops in the Shenandoah

Valley would amount to 35,467 men (Blenker's 10,028 men and
24 artillery pieces, V Corps's 19,687 men and forty-one
guns, 3,652 disposable cavalry, and 2,100 railroad guards).
Hooker, on the Lower Potomac, was to be relieved by a
regiment of 850 men, who would join 500 cavalry to be left
there.
Thus, the General concluded, he had deployed the
following numbers for the defense of the capital, with
18,000 left "for the garrisons and the front of Washington":
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At
At
In
On

Warrenton:
Manassas:
Shenandoah Valley:
Lower Potomac:

7,780
10,859
35,467
1,350

Total:

55,45631

This, he said, was entirely sufficient for the
protection of the city, even if Blenker's division was
subtracted, especially since the threat of Confederate
attack was minimal:

Johnston was behind the Rappahannock

with no means of advance.

Moreover, the city's defensive

works were in good condition, manned by disciplined troops.
And, most importantly, the Army of the Potomac's operations
on the Peninsula would pull the remainder of the Rebel army
even farther away from the capital.

"Surrounded as

Washington was with numerous and strong fortifications well
garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not afford
to detach from his main army a force sufficient to assail
them."32

-^McClellan to Thomas, 1 April 1862, OR, 11, pt. 3:5960.
32McClellan, Report, 142-3.

CHAPTER SIX
BURY CAESAR

People, and senators, be not affrighted;
Fly not; stand still:
ambition's debt is paid.
Ill, i

Stanton's next action was passing strange, in light of
the fact that he had already accepted McClellan's figures as
comforting enough to justify sending 19,000 of the General's
men to Fremont:

scarcely had the General left the docks

than the Secretary he demanded a report from Wadsworth on
the state of the city's defense forces.-*-

Wadsworth reported

that he had under his command 15,335 infantry, 4,294
artillery and 848 cavalry (of which only six companies were
mounted), for a total of 20,477.

Less sick and those in

arrest and confinement, there were but 19,022 men in
Washington and Alexandria.

Further, they were "new and

imperfectly disciplined" troops, and there was no mounted
light artillery.

Moreover, from this force he was ordered

to send away 4,000 men to Manassas, and four additional

^Stanton's motives must be suspect in issuing this
order, since the Inspector General had only days before
received a report on the fortifications, made in the course
of the Army's preparations for departure.
See pp. 67-68.
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regiments to various other commands.

In short,

"looking at

the numerical strength and character of the force under my
command, it is in my judgment entirely inadequate to and
unfit for the important duty to which it is a s s i g n e d . "2
Immediately Stanton pounced on Hitchcock and Adjutant
General Lorenzo Thomas, ordering them to investigate whether
McClellan had complied with the President's orders of 13
March to "leave Washington entirely s e c u r e . T h e two
generals noted McClellan's figures (55,456 total) and
Wadsworth's

(19,022 "imperfectly disciplined" men), factored

into the equation the corps commanders' 13 March definitionof a sufficient covering force (which Hitchcock and Thomas
put at 25,000, with 30,000 to fully garrison the forts on
the right bank of the Potomac), and concluded that McClellan
had indeed not obeyed the President's order to protect the
capital.4

Hitchcock later testified that when he and Thomas

^Wadsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
Later, before the CCW, Wadsworth testified that at this time
he had only five regiments with any artillery training or
experience.
The left bank of the Potomac was stronger than
the right, but he would have to strip the city's forts to
garrison the ones south of the river. He estimated that he
needed 25,000 "first class" troops for Washington's defense.
When the Confederates at Gordonville and Culpeper left, he
conceded that he would need fewer troops. Wadsworth
consistently maintained that there was no Union army between
the Confederates and Washington. JCCW 1:252-3.
•^Stanton to Thomas and Hitchcock, 2 April 1862, OR, 11,
p t . 3:57.
^Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton
Papers.
They noted that McClellan had included Banks' corps
in his figures, but declined to express an opinion as to
whether Valley troops should rightly be considered part of a
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deducted Banks and Blenker, they could not find "25,000 men
as a unit of force" for the forts at Washington and on the
two banks of the Potomac, concluding, "If there was need of
a military force for the safety of the city of Washington
within its own limits that referred to in the report of
General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate."5
Although their investigation had taken less than a day, they
were convinced that the capital was in danger.

When this

was reported to Lincoln (as fast as Stanton could manage),
"he was manifestly under great anxiety."6

The President

thereupon instructed the War Secretary to hold back one
corps from McClellan— either McDowell's or Sumner's— for the
protection of the city.^
Stanton ordered McDowell detached and informed
McClellan that this had been done because the President
deemed the defenses of Washington inadequate.®

McDowell

deployed his troops around Manassas, Warrenton, and
Centreville.^

On 5 April, I and V Corps were detached

defense force for Washington.
^Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Ibid.
^Hitchcock's testimony before McDowell inquiry, 16
January 1863, OR, 12, pt. 1:220.
^Lincoln to Stanton, 3 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
®Thomas to McClellan, 4 April 1862, OR 12, p t . 3:66.
^McDowell to Colonel Edmond Schriver (Chief of Staff),
3 April 1862, Ibid., 39-40.
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completely from the Army of the Potomac and made respec
tively the Armies of the Rappahannock and Shenandoah.10
Stanton directed McDowell that Washington was "especially
under your protection" and that he was not to move his
troops out of position for the defense of the city.1!
Meanwhile, Major General John E. Wool's command at Fort
Monroe was removed from McClellan's control, reducing his
force by another 10,000.12

Thus, at a time when unified

military coordination was vital, McClellan was relieved of
command of not only other forces but also of all Virginia
armies except the three corps he had with him.

Now there

were four commanders in the theatre between the Alleghenies
and the Atlantic.

Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, as well as

various independent commands, received orders from Lincoln
and other civilians, Thomas or Hitchcock .^

McClellan was

quick to note that the creation of these two new departments
deprived him of control of his supply depots at Washington,
his base of operations at Point Comfort and command of the
l^Thomas to McClellan, 5 April 1862.

McClellan Papers.

-^■^Stanton to McDowell, 11 April 18 62, OR 12, pt. 3:66.
■^Thomas to McClellan, 3 April 1862, McClellan, Report,
156.
13Charles A. Whittier, "Comments on the Peninsular
Campaign of General McClellan," paper read before the
Military Historical Society of Massachussets, 13 November
1876, in MHSM 1:233-34. Whittier observes that Halleck was
unsuited by nature and habits to coordinate the sort of
effort necessary, and Thomas and Hitchcock were simply
without talent.
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theatre.

He also took it to mean that he was relieved of

responsibility for the defense of Washington, but he
nonetheless protested vehemently against the disruption of
his command and his campaign.14

Since making his plans for

the Peninsula campaign, he had lost 50,000 men; he now would
have only 85,000 when all arrived.

At least, he begged,

send I Corps to take Gloucester and enable rapid movement to
West Point .^
Lincoln responded by citing the numbers Wadsworth had
given him, remonstrating that " . . .

less than twenty

thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery,
were all you designed to be left for the defense of
Washington and Manassas Junction," part of which was to be
moved to the Lower Potomac.

It would have been adequate,

Lincoln said, if Banks were at Manassas, but McClellan
disturbed that plan without substituting any other force for
that area, leaving the line from Richmond to Washington
"entirely open, except [for] what resistance could be
presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops."
With Banks in the Shenandoah Valley instead of at Manassas,
the Confederates would be tempted "to turn back from the
Rappahannock and sack Washington."

Therefore, McClellan had

-^McClellan to Lincoln, 6 April 1862, Lincoln Papers;
McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign," in Battles and
Leaders, 2:170.
l ^ M c C l e l l a n to Stanton, 7 April 1862, McClellan, Civil
War Correspondence, 232.
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patently neglected the President's repeated orders to leave
Washington secure, and Lincoln had acted appropriately by
withholding McDowell.
Another blow to the campaign was General Order No. 33,
which closed recruiting depots for volunteers and halted all
recruitment.^

There would be no new troops to sustain the

Army of the Potomac on its campaign.
There was also the loss of the Navy.

McClellan had

emphasized to Stanton the "absolute necessity" of swift
movement to West Point, whence he expected to take Richmond.
The batteries at Yorktown would have to be dealt with,
either besieging the town or through a combined operation
against it with a strong flanking corps under cover of the
Navy.

A siege would slow down the entire campaign;

-^Lincoln to McClellan, 7 April 1862, Lincoln Papers.
The President warned McClellan that he was making political
enemies with his attempts to reorganize his army to the
benefit of his favorite subordinates. Lincoln himself has
had to suffer political slanders; McClellan must learn to do
the same.
-^McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 151. McClellan
took this as a personal attack on himself, but barely two
weeks before Wadsworth had reported that so many troops had
arrived in Washington that he believed "the force now here
amply sufficient for the protection of the capital." He
begged that the Secretary send him no more troops, at least
until he could arrange for sanitation requirements.
Wadsworth to Stanton, 21 March 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:7.
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therefore he needed both McDowell's corps (which was to
perform the flanking maneuver) and the Navy.18
Toward that end, McClellan and his subordinates had
negotiated with Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus V. Fox for
support in the action.^

on 17 March, McDowell informed his

chief that Fox "promises all the power of the Department
shall be at our disposal" and said that Louis M.
Goldsborough, Flag Officer commanding the blockade force in
the Lower Chesapeake, would be conferring with one of his
subordinates.20

But three days later, McDowell reported

that "the ability of the Navy to do their part" was now in
question.21
Concerning Yorktown, Fox later insisted that "the Navy
Department never was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in
regard to any thing connected with the matter."

Goldsbor-

l8McClellan to Stanton, 19 March 1862, OR 5:57-58.
The
Secretary responded that Lincoln would talk with the General
on this issue.
Stanton to McClellan, 19 March 1862, Ibid.,
11, pt. 3:18. There appears to be no evidence, however,
that such a conference ever took place.
l^Reed blames these attempts to get naval cooperation
for the delay in implementing the Peninsula campaign, and
for McClellan's reliance on I Corps' amphibious capability."
Reed, 130.
^McDowell to McClellan, 17 March 1862, OR 11, pt. 3:9.
Lt.-Col. Daniel P. Woodbury of the engineers included in his
report on the Peninsular conditions a statement that
Goldsborough "expressed his desire to co-operate in every
way." Woodbury to McClellan, 19 March 1862, Ibid., 22-24.
^McDowell to McClellan, 20 March 1862 , Ibid., 24-25.
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ough had been directed to cooperate as much as possible, he
conceded, but no plan was ever submitted to the Navy from
the War Department for such a combined operation? in fact,
it was not practicable for his gunships to attack the
Yorktown batteries, which were placed too high.

Moreover,

he concluded, "no complaint was ever made to the Navy
Department" regarding the situation.22
It seems clear that McClellan, with his penchant for
seeing things as he wanted them to be, was simply making the
assumption that, because he wanted the Navy to reduce the

22John C. Palfrey, "The Siege of Yorktown," paper read
before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts 14
January 1878, in MHSM 1:43-44.
Reed posits that there was a
conspiracy directed against McClellan, claiming that there
are only two documents extant of a correspondence "reflec
ting the abundant negotiations on the subject" of Navy co
operation in the Peninsula Campaign (one of 14 March 1862
from Welles to Stanton, denying McClellan's request for a
squadron at Port Royal; and one of 24 March from Fox to
Goldsborough leaving it up to the latter if or how to co
operate with McClellan)— all the rest were removed to pro
tect the guilty.
Reed, 126. This seems a bit farfetched,
particularly in light of the fact that no one (Reed in
cluded) has ever accused the Navy of being actively antiMcClellan.
Even as she suggests a plot, Reed notes that
there is nothing in OR, or the papers of Fox, Welles or
McCellan, to indicate that direct support of the Yorktown
assault was ever promised.
It is hard to credit McClellan
with destroying or concealing any real or imagined evidence
that he was wronged in this matter. And finally, given
Welles's and Stanton's mutual antipathy, it is unlikely that
the Navy Secretary would engage in such shenanigans in a
cause that would play into the War Secretary's hands.
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Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries, the Navy would do
so. 23

The loss of McDowell is perhaps more serious.
McClellan believed he had left sufficient troops in

Northern Virginia adequately to defend Washington.

Stanton

had apparently felt that the city was so secure that 19,000
troops could be sent to Fremont.

And even Hitchcock had

given tacit approval when McClellan sent him figures on the
arrangements for the city's defense, as he declined to offer
any suggestions, since McClellan was more familiar with the
situation.24
This, of course, was before Jackson nipped Banks's
heels at Kernstown.

McClellan had to delay the transfer of

V Corps to Manassas in hopes of stopping Jackson.

And

Lincoln himself believed this was an splendid opportunity to
clear the Confederates from the Valley— he continually
pressed Banks, Fremont, and (eventually) McDowell to catch
Jackson in some sort of pincer maneuver.

But as time went

on, and Jackson remained at liberty, things seem to have
altered:

the longer he escaped capture or defeat, the more

menacing he appeared.

23McClellan knew before leaving Washington that naval
support in the reduction of the Yorktown batteries was
unlikely, as evidenced by his instructions to General
William F. Barry, his Chief of Artillery, to come equipped
for besieging the town's works.
McClellan to Barry, 22
March 1862, McClellan Papers.
24OR, 5:63.
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In making provision for the defense of Washington,
McClellan did not believe it was necessary to occupy
Manassas in force.

The enemy had retreated across the

Rappahannock, destroying the only bridge that enabled him to
recross.

Hitchcock and Thomas agreed: "In regard to

occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the
railroads leading to it it may be fair to assume that they
have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their
late position, and therefore no very large force would be
necessary to hold that position."25

Even Wadsworth thought

it "very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this
point."25

yet this is where McDowell situated his corps-

cum-army, without comment from Lincoln, Stanton or the
Washington generals.

Stanton in fact soon had intelligence

confirming that the Confederates had left the Rappahannock
for Yorktown; but he made no changes in McDowell's
disposition.
McClellan also had counted Banks's corps in the
Shenandoah Valley as a substantial and legitimate part of
the defense of Washington.

Here there was controversy.

25Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, OR 11,
p t . 3:61.
26\r?adsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
The MDW commander qualified this statement by noting "this
belief is based upon the hope that they [the enemy] may be
promptly engaged elsewhere, and may not learn the number and
character of the force left here."
Ibid.
27stanton to Banks, 13 April 1862, OR 11, pt. 3:94.
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McDowell stated that the 13 March council of corps
commanders did not think Valley troops should be included in
the capital defense forces, and McDowell himself did not
consider Valley troops "properly applicable" to the city's
d

e

f

e

n

s

e

.

28

Hitchcock believed that the troops at Warrenton

and Manassas were a legitimate part of the defense of
Washington; but the Valley was really a separate front, and
therefore Banks should not have been included because he was
actually needed in that theatre.

Moreover, since Blenker

was removed from the Army of the Potomac, he should not have
been counted among the defense forces at all.29
McClellan of course saw it differently.

Again and

again, he insisted that he left plenty of high quality
troops well-placed for the city's defense, but
administration actions kept back 134,000 men, leaving him
but 85,000 to carry on a campaign that required from 110,000
to 140,000, "according to circumstances."^

^ M c D o w e l l testimony at McDowell Inquiry, 12 December
1862, OR 12, pt. 1:104.

^Hitchcock before McDowell inquiry, 16 January 1863,
OR, 12, pt. 1:220. Hitchcock felt, at the time, that
Blenker ought not to have been sent to Fremont.
He said so
to Stanton, who agreed and sent the General to Lincoln to
argue the case— unsuccessfully.
^McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 241? McClellan to
Stanton, 3 February 1862, Gorham, 376-77.
In refuting
McClellan's claims to have only 85,000 troops with him,
Gorham goes on to point out that, according to McClellan's
own statements, by 5 April, Assistant Secretary of War John
Tucker reported having transported 121,500 men to Fort
Monroe.
Ibid.
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Regarding the withholding of I Corps, on 3 April,
McDowell discussed it with one of his division commanders,
who reported to McClellan.
McDowell told me that it was intended as a blow at
you.
That Stanton had said that you intended to
work by strategy and not by fighting? that all of
the opponents of the policy of the administration
centred around you— in other words, that you had
political aspirations.31
McDowell urged Stanton not to withhold troops from McClellan
because if the General did have political ambitions, this
blow would only serve them; Stanton was unmoved.^
This rift between Stanton and McClellan became a public
issue, as Democratic newspapers proclaimed that a Radical
plot to destroy McClellan's
endangering the

political chances

was

Army of the Potomac.

The radicals have gained, by some means or other,
a very dangerous influence over the War
Department, and an end cannot be put [to]
it a
moment too
soon. . . .They want to have the war
prolonged. . . . They know the [speedy]
restoration of the Union would be the death knell
of their faction. . . ."33
Stanton was warned that there was "much feeling"
regarding his "depriving" McClellan of I Corps, but he

^Franklin to McClellan, 7 April 1862, in McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story, 151.
^william B. Franklin, "The First Great Crime of the
War," in The Annals of the War Written by Leading
Participants North and South, ed. Alexander K. McClure
(Philadelphia:
Times Publishing Co., 1879), 81.
^James G. Bennett, signed editorial in New York
Herald, 4 April 1862, in Drozdowski, 789.
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remained steadfast.34

in fact, he was even then consulting

with Chase and Admiral John A. Dalgren to combine Fremont's
and Banks's forces under McDowell and send them south to
take Richmond while McClellan wallowed on the Peninsula.

At

a military council on 9 April, the President rejected that
plan because he knew Fremont would never serve under
MeDowel1.35
Thus in a few days had McClellan's brilliant campaign
plan been destroyed.

To his mind the withholding of I Corps

was the shattering blow.
It frustrated all my plans for impending
operations.
It fell when I was too deeply
committed to withdraw.
It left me incapable of
continuing operations that had been begun.
It
compelled the adoption of another, a different,
and a less effective plan of campaign.
It made
rapid and brilliant operations impossible.
It was
a fatal error.35

3^C.C. Fulton to Stanton, 9 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
This correspondent laid the blame on machinations by
McDowell, concluding that "if we should be defeated through
trickery of McDowell, a terrible retribution will rest
somewhere."
3^Drozdowski , 7 60.

36McClellan, Report, 553.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUCH SLIPPERY GROUND

How many ages hence
Shall this our lofty scene be acted over
In states unborn and accents yet unknown!
Ill, i

McClellan never wavered from his claim that the loss of
I Corps sounded the death knell for the Peninsula campaign
and that its detachment had no military basis.

Stanton

conspired with the Radicals to undermine all his plans to
ensure his defeat and all talk of the security of the
capital was merely a smokescreen for the plot to ruin the
victory that rightly belonged to him and his Army.
The General believed that he had indeed left Washington
safe from attack.

Throughout the Peninsula campaign, he

insisted, Northern Virginia was "completely in our
possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the
presence of the enemy."

The capital, he said, was never

threatened until the Confederates learned of the Army of the
Potomac's evacuation from the Peninsula.1

Therefore, the

McClellan, Report, 124. As it happens, the
Confederate army in Virginia was indeed concentrated on the
Peninsula (except, of course for Jackson in the Valley).
But at the same time, McClellan always contended that
Johnston evacuated Manassas and Centreville only upon
84
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withholding of I Corps was not— could not--be predicated on
military considerations; it had to be a political decision,
made with the specific intent of ruining McClellan.
This is certainly the way the Democratic press saw the
case.

Moreover, there is evidence that Stanton was doing

his best to undermine the General:

offering command of the

Army of the Potomac to Hitchcock, pushing for reinforcements
for Fremont, maneuvering for the corps reorganization, even
scandalmongering.2
Stanton's duplicity notwithstanding, the character of
the times must be taken into consideration when examining
decisions that were made regarding the conduct of the war.
Rabid as McClellan's supporters in the press were, there was
equal fervor on the Radical side.

Those who believed in the

conspiracy of the Slave Power considered McClellan and his

learning of the Union plans for an advance along the
Peninsula.
20n 2 April, Senator Orville H. Browning met with
Stanton and Lincoln.
The Secretary repeated a rumor that
McClellan had been inducted by Jefferson Davis into the
Knights of the Golden Circle only two years previously.
Word was that Davis was McClellan's mentor and still had
power and influence over the Union General.
Therefore,
McClellan would never really try to defeat the South.
Stanton added that "he didn't believe these imputations of
disloyalty, but they were believed extensively and did us
injury," Browning noted.
Stanton pursued Browning,
insisting that McClellan was not in earnest, and should have
been removed long since. He urged Browning to propose to
the President the promotion of one Colonel N.B. Buford to
Major General and command of the Army of the Potomac—
Stanton would second the nomination.
Even McDowell was
better than McClellan, Stanton concluded.
2 April 1862,
Browning, 1:538-39.
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ilk the personification of that evil which was sapping the
vigor of the Union cause.

Jane Grey Swisshelm, a Minnesota

abolitionist, exemplifies this viewpoint.

McClellan, she

wrote, purposely sent Baker to Ball's Bluff "to be disposed
of" and took the Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula's
swamps "to be decimated by disease and by placing detached
corps on positions to be attacked by overwhelming numbers of
the enemy."

In fact, not to put too fine a point upon it,

McClellan was allied with Satan.3
The Radicals despised and feared McClellan as much for
his West Point background as his Democratic political
leanings.

They continually pressured Lincoln to remove

McClellan and replace him with a general with political bona
fides.

They were afraid that the war would be settled

without a southern defeat and the destruction of slavery,
that it would end before they had firmly grasped the reins
of power.4

Yet their choice— Fremont— was not having much

success, either.

The Pathfinder could not seem to locate a

road to Jackson that would decisively end the Valley
campaign, and his demands for reinforcements matched

311 April 1863, Jane G. Swisshelm, Crusader and
Feminist:
Letters of Jane Grey Swisshelm, 1858-1865, ed.
Arthur J. Larsen (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Historical
Society, 1934; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press,
Inc., 1976), 213-216.
This date is not in error:
long
after McClellan had been removed from command (and before he
became a presidential candidate), the Radicals continued to
fulminate against him.
4Wil liams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 10-26 passim.
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McClellan's throughout the spring of 1862.

Eventually, he

would resign his appointment rather than serve under John
Pope (yet another Radical torchbearer).
Without question, Jackson played a significant role in
this drama.

His actions in the Shenandoah Valley upset

McClellan's plans for the defense of Washington and caused
Lincoln mounting anxiety.

Although early on Banks knew that

the Confederate forces were quite small,5 the fact that
three different armies could not stop Jackson from going
where he would must have driven the President crazy.

He

withheld first Blenker in hopes of Fremont ridding the
Valley of Jackson, and then McDowell to reinforce the
capital's security.
Jackson was free.

The city would not be safe while
By late May, Lincoln was himself devising

strategy and tactics, trying to coordinate Banks, McDowell
and Fremont into springing a trap on Jackson.

And it was

his choice to withhold a corps from McClellan's field force
to protect Washington.
This decision was based on a rather astonishing paper
chase:

McClellan insisted that he left more than 70,000

troops for the defense of the city; Wadsworth et al.
answered that there were only 19,000.

This is a serious

discrepancy, yet historians do not seem to have explored it.
They accept the figures of either one side or the other and

5Banks to Thomas, 6 April 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:48-50.
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go on from there.

There are several curious mysteries

involved in these numeric differences that had such serious
consequences, curiosities that lend support to the idea that
the withholding of McDowell's corps was not based in
military necessity.
For one thing, there was a rather indecent haste
attached to the "investigations" by Wadsworth, Thomas and
Hitchcock:

both reports were made 2 April, presumably

within hours of Stanton's queries, and, significantly, the
day after McClellan departed for Old Point Comfort--while he
was i n c o m m u n i c a d o .6

it seems unlikely indeed that this

triumvirate had access to any relevant documents unavailable
to McClellan, and they certainly could not have uncovered
any such new figures in the brief time they devoted to their
inquiries.
Further, in all the documents relating to the numbers
of troops defending Washington, Wadsworth, Thomas and
Hitchcock only mentioned forces in the city itself (the
19,000 men).

The latter two did go so far as to note that

Manassas was probably a moot point and sniffed that the
value of forces in the Shenandoah Valley was not really
their concern.7

Yet the council of corps commanders had

considered a covering force integral to the city's defense

6OR, 11, pt. 3:57-62.
7Ibid., 61.
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network, and in McClellan's summary the Military District of
Washington was only part of that system (of 70,000 men).
Wadsworth's figures for the troops under his command were
not so very different from McClellan's, but the Commanding
General emphasized a "covering force", which Stanton's
triumvirate seems to have ignored completely.^
Checking the monthly troop returns to discover what
exactly the situation was does not help much to resolve the
discrepancy.

They were in fact not officially compiled and

submitted until four months later.9

There is no indication

that they were ultimately "fixed," but they are not
necessarily indisputable evidence of what McClellan and his
opponents saw and relied upon in those crucial days in

^Another oddity is the fact that McClellan never
pursued this question. What he did do was remonstrate with
both Lincoln and Stanton about the detachment of I Corps—
but only from the viewpoint of his campaign plans being
ruined.
He never addressed the issue of his provisions for
Washington's security, leading to speculation that he was
not ready to live and die by the accuracy of his numbers.
9See Appendix. The return from which these figures
were drawn was for the entire Army of the Potomac. Monthly
returns for individual units (up to the divisonal level),
which might help get at the actual counts, are not filed in
the same manner as those for armies. They are apparently
kept amongst the daily troop musters, which are stored
higgledy-piggledy in mismarked cartons in the National
Archives, unsorted and seemingly undisturbed since their
dumping there sometime in the last century.
Trying to find
the relevant documents and make sense of them would be
heartbreaking work, if not an impossibility.
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April.10

The return's figures for the Military District of

Washington (19,920 enlisted present for duty? 22,410
aggregate present and absent)

support McClellan's 1 April

count? plus another 1,459 in the Military District of
Alexandria (part of Wadsworth's command as of 17 March).
Wadsworth's total of 20,477, with 19,022 present for duty is
certainly clo s e . H

But he did not mention any of the other

troops included in McClellan's 1 April disposition, nor
listed in the March return for the Army of the Potomac.

He

did not specify whether he had included troops from the MDA,
but it seems unlikely.
unattached units

Nor did he apparently mention the

(on the March return amounting to some

8,000 troops), which were left in and about the capital and
later transferred to the MDW command.

He likewise excluded

the 13,430 men (as on March's return) under Major General
John A. Dix in Maryland (6,988 by McClellan's 1 April
estimate).

And he disregarded the 3,317 railway guards

(3,359 in McClellan's), which McClellan wanted moved forward
to Manassas— albeit with 4,000 of Wadsworth's troops.
Interestingly, the March return's total for the troops
available for the defense of Washington, Maryland, the
Valley and Northern Virginia was in excess of 91,000, more

10The official returns do reflect minor discrepancies
from the figures published as extracts in the OR. But these
differences are tiny indeed.
■^Wadsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
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even than McClellan's figures, which his detractors claimed
were outrageously inflated, if not downright fabrications.
Subtracting Blenker, Banks, and Dix, there were still nearly
32,000 troops in and immediately around Washington--and
designed to be left there for its protection.^2
It is true that Banks had not been able to take up
position around Manassas, and Lincoln had made his concern
for security there abundantly plain.

But his force was

serving its proper function by countering the threat in the
Valley.

If V Corps had been at Manassas, covering the

Rappahannock, it would be expected to parry any attempt by
Jackson to menace Washington.

As it was, he was keeping the

Confederates occupied a good distance from the capital.
McClellan counted these troops in the Shenandoah Valley
as a legitimate part of the capital's defense network.
Thomas's and Hitchcock's refusal to comment on the utility
of Valley forces was an indication that they disagreed.
Corps was among the many units that went unmentioned in
Wadsworth's report.

And Lincoln clearly believed that if

the men in the Shenandoah should be counted at all, they
must be considered secondary to those at Manassas and

12These figures, of course, represent the aggregate
present and absent (everyone who was on the rolls as
assigned to a unit). Present for duty figures would be
smaller by about ten to twenty percent.
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Warrenton.

This point has been debated by military men

and historians— with no resolution.

But, again, Banks was

doing at least as good a job in the Valley as he could have
around Manassas

(given his inate ineptitude), so it would

seem that McClellan was correct.
And if the retention of I Corps was for solely military
reasons— for the defense of Washington and the destruction
of Jackson— its disposition around Manassas was an odd de
ployment.

The defensive works around Washington were in

good order and were manned two years later with far fewer
troops than were left in the city in the spring of 1862.14
By all accounts, there was a consensus that this was the
least likely approach for any Confederate attack— there was
no means for the enemy to cross the river in force.

All the

l^Lincoln to McClellan, 7 April 1862, Lincoln Papers.
Justifying the retention of I Corps, the President stated
that McClellan's provisions for the safety of Washington
would have been adequate with Banks at Manassas, but when
McClellan "disturbed" that deployment (keeping V Corps in
the Valley, and not putting a comparable force along the
Virginia line), he had endangered the capital.
Clearly,
Banks at Manassas meant security; Banks in the Valley meant
peril.
The Department of the Shenandoah had been detached
from McClellan's command as of 3 April.
Lincoln himself
could have moved Banks to Manassas instead of withholding
McDowell, had he really deemed this the best disposition for
the security of Washington.
•^Although it must be noted that in 18 64 Lincoln had
more confidence in General Ulysses S. Grant's strategy and
his ability to cover Washington.
Moreover, by then, it was
clear that the European powers were not going to support the
Confederacy, so there was not as much riding on any attack
on the capital.
Confederate General Jubal A. Early's July
near miss was more in the way of counting coup than a
strategic threat to the city.
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action was then taking place in the Valley and soon on the
Peninsula.

Yet McDowell was parked at Manassas and told

that his special charge was the protection of Washington,
and he would "make no movement throwing your force out of
position for the discharge of this primary duty."15

Then he

was given orders to advance by land to join with McClellan
north of Richmond; then to work with Banks and Fremont to
catch Jackson.16

In the end, his corps was exhausted by the

marches across Northern Virginia, Jackson slipped through
the three Yankee armies, and McClellan was deprived of his
flanking column.

Nearly 40,000 troops were, in effect,

completely wasted.
McClellan spent a great deal of time remonstrating with
Stanton and the President over the loss of I Corps.

He

complained that this action was to blame for the failure of
the Peninsular Campaign, from beginning (the need to lay
siege to Yorktown instead of flanking it) to end (dividing
his Army across the Chickahominy River, leaving it to be
attacked

p i e c e m e a l ) . - ^

These charges have been debated for

^Stanton to McDowell, 15 April 18 62, OR 12 pt. 3:66.
^Stanton to McDowell, 17 May 1862, Ibid., 11, 1:28?
Stanton to McDowell, 24 May 1862, Ibid., 12, 1:28; Lincoln
to McDowell, 24 May 1862, Lincoln, 5:232-3.
•^His claim that sending I Corps overland caused him to
extend his own men across the Chickahominy in May does not
hold up well:
as soon as the James River was cleared by the
destruction of the Virginia and the Norfolk Navy Yard—
before McDowell's order to advance— McClellan made no moye
to change his base of operation to the James River; and in
fact never mentioned this possibility until long after the
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more than 128 years, and it seems pointless to throw more
wood on that fire.
The issue here is whether the decision to withhold I
Corps was made for purely military reasons.
appear to be out of the question.

That would

McClellan had left a

force for the defense of the Washington area that should
have been adequate.

Banks was doing his job (more or less),

the defense works around the city were in good condition,
and there were no Confederates to speak of north of the
Rappahannock or east of the Blue Ridge.

Retaining

McDowell's entire corps and deploying it around Manassas
seems both excessive and redundant.
It is true that McClellan had not complied with
presidential orders:

while his provisions for the defense

of Washington may have been adequate, they did not meet the
specifications laid down by his 13 March council of corps
commanders.1®

This left him open to Stanton's very

carefully worded charge:

"[R]eport to me whether the

campaign had ended.
Both options (moving to the James or
staying with the original West Point plan) are noted in
McClellan's Own Story, 342-43. But three pages later, he
lays blame for the loss of the entire campaign on McDowell's
orders to join him overland.
Ibid., 346. Yet, he later
testified that he would have been entirely glad to have
McDowell's corps no matter how it arrived.
McClellan before
McDowell inquiry, 10 December 1862, OR 12, pt. 1:95.
■^I.e., the covering force (excluding the Federals in
the Valley, which were clearly of no account to the
triumvirate) did not amount to the 25,000 to 40,000 men
recommended.
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President’s order and instructions have been complied with
in respect to the forces to be left for the defense of
Washington and its security and at Manassas."19
If this action was not taken for military reasons,
then, what could be the motivation?
both psychological and political.

These would have to be
There was a climate of

anxiety in Washington, which had been perceived as being in
danger to greater or lesser degrees since the Secession
Winter of 1860— 61.

An attack on the city— successful or

not— could tip the international scales in favor of the
Confederacy.

The Radicals had their own ideological agenda,,

which they believed took priority over purely military
objectives.

And McClellan scorned to inform his civilian

superiors even as he declined to consult his subordinates.
Lincoln was trying to balance all these opposing interests
while still maintaining a government.

He made mistakes.

One element in those errors was his loss of confidence
in McClellan, for which the General has himself largely to
blame.

Lincoln's concerns for the security of the city—

regardless of their basis in military reality— were made
clear repeatedly in presidential inquiries and orders.
McClellan in his arrogance ignored them, refusing to explain
his actions or plans to the President, and he paid the
consequences.

If I Corps was withheld for non-military

19Stanton to Thomas and Hitchcock, 2 April 1862, OR 11,
p t . 3:57.
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reasons— to reinforce the sense of security (if not the
actual safety) for the Federal capital— this is not to say
that psychological considerations are invalid when making
military decisions.
Another factor, of course, was politics.

Republicans

were taking over the reins of power, with all the turmoil
that accompanies a change of government.

That this was

going on during a civil war exacerbated the viciousness of
that process.

In particular there was the fanatical

antagonism displayed by the Radicals, in which Stanton
clearly took active part.

If not forming an actual cabal,

these men certainly found it to their mutual advantage to
work together to undermine McClellan:

the Jacobins to

restructure the prosecution of the war along their
ideological lines and Stanton to gather the reins of power.
Wade and his ilk had laid the groundwork by pushing for
Fremont's new command and reinforcements and for the
reorganization of the Army of the Potomac.

But it was the

War Secretary who waited until McClellan was out of the city
and away from a telegraph to instigate the reports of
Wadsworth et al., who played on Lincoln's fears, and who
directed the deployment of McDowell.

There would be no West

Point/Democratic Caesar to triumph if Stanton and the
Radicals had any say in the matter.

If they had to risk a

short-term loss on the Peninsula in order to entrench their
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individual and collective power, well, that was the price to
be paid.
Thus the General was undermined:

stripped of supreme

command, refused naval support, removed from control of his
supply depots, cut of from new recruits, and, finally,
denied his flanking corps.

His ordeal, unlike Caesar's,

would be dragged out for six months before he would
ultimately be removed from command of his beloved Army.

But

the fatal blow, he was always convinced, was the withholding
of McDowell's corps.
cut of all."

For him, it was the "most unkindest

APPENDIX
TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON1

Unit

Location

Number

Blenker Division

Warrenton Junction

10,584

Banks Corps

Woodstock

32,625

Military District
of Washington2

Washington

22,410

Military District
of Alexandria-^

Alexandria

1,459

D i x 's Division^

Maryland

Railway Brigade^

Washington

13,430
3,317

Abstracted from Return for March, 18 62, of Army of the
Potomac.
Signed by George B. McClellan, Major General,
Commanding, 4 August 1862, Harrison's Landing, Virginia.
National Archives, RG 94, Returns of the Army of the Potomac
and the Army of the Rappahannock.
^Command instituted 15 March 18 62, per General Order
No. 25, War Department.
^Command instituted 17 March 1862, per Special Order
No. 83, Army of the Potomac.
^Transferred to Middle Department, 22 March 1862.
^Transferred to Middle Department, 22 March, 1862.
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Unattached Units
Volunteer Artillery®

Washington

Fort Washington^

134
198

Field Works &
Artillery

North of Potomac

Co. B, 26th Penn.
Volunteers®

Washington

Field Works &
Artillery9

South of Potomac

TOTAL:

4,371
93
1,511
90,132

^Transferred to Military District of Washington
^Transferred to Military District of Washington
®Transferred to J.S. Wadsworth, etc.
^Transferred to J.S. Wadsworth, etc.
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